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ABSTRACT
Today the executive branch is generally seen as the most dangerous branch.
Many worry that the executive branch now defies or subsumes the separation of
powers. In response, several Supreme Court Justices and prominent scholars
assert that the very separation-of-powers principles that determine the structure
of the federal government as a whole apply with full force within the executive
branch. In particular, they argue that constitutional law prohibits the
accumulation of more than one type of power—legislative, executive, and
judicial—in the same executive official or government entity. We refer to this as
the anti-accumulation principle. The consequences of this principle, applied to
its full extension, are vast. It would invite a new era of constitutional policing of
the internal structure of the executive branch and administrative agencies.
This Article argues that separation-of-powers law contains no antiaccumulation principle. Unable to find textual support in the Constitution for
this principle, proponents latch on to but misread James Madison’s famous
statement that the “accumulation of all powers . . . in the same hands . . . may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.” Functional
considerations—like fairness, avoiding the triumph of faction, and efficiency—
also do not justify the anti-accumulation principle or its application internally
to the executive branch.
The anti-accumulation principle is generally posited by jurists and scholars
whose leanings are formalist and conservative. However, a set of liberal
scholars commit the same error. More focused on checks and balances than on
pure separation of powers, these scholars either defend or seek to reform the
current structure of the executive branch. In doing so, they either invoke or
assume the existence of an anti-accumulation principle, working from the
premise that the principles that justified the allocation of power among the three
branches must also apply within the executive branch.
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While the executive branch needs greater constraint, separation of powers
neither requires greater internal divisions nor provides a robust menu for
reform. To the extent valid constitutional concerns underlie the antiaccumulation principle, they rest on due process and should be evaluated as
such.
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INTRODUCTION
Today the executive branch is generally seen as the most dangerous branch.1
Scholars from different perspectives share the view that the contemporary
executive branch dominates in a way that fundamentally challenges, and perhaps
overwhelms and defies, separation of powers. On the legal liberal side, Neal
Katyal writes that the executive now “subsumes much of the tripartite structure
of government.”2 Peter Shane observes that the system of checks and balances
has been “increasingly battered by . . . the gathering concentration of power in
the hands of the federal executive.”3 Bruce Ackerman and Martin Flaherty label
the executive the “most dangerous branch”4 and argue for reforms to bring it
within the constitutional scheme.5 On the right, Philip Hamburger has become
the standard-bearer for laments that “[t]he administrative regime consolidates in
one branch of government the powers that the Constitution allocates to different
branches.”6

1
See, e.g., Abner S. Greene, Checks and Balances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking,
61 U. CHI. L. REV. 123, 125 (1994) (“[T]he framers’ factual assumptions [that the legislature
would be the most dangerous branch] have been displaced. Now, it is the President whose
power has expanded and who therefore needs to be checked.”); William P. Marshall, Eleven
Reasons Why Presidential Power Inevitably Expands and Why It Matters, 88 B.U. L. REV.
505, 506 (2008) (“[The] expansion in presidential power has created a constitutional
imbalance between the executive and legislative branches, calling into doubt the continued
efficacy of the structure of separation of powers set forth by the Framers.”); Jessica BulmanPozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 459,
465-66 (2012) (“[C]ommentators have suggested that the three branches have become
unbalanced, with the executive exercising a predominant, and often unchecked, role.”).
2
Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2316 (2006).
3
PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 3 (2009); see also Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power and
Administrative Rulemaking, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 451 (1979) (“The increasing sprawl of the
federal agencies has challenged the effectiveness of the checks and balances designed by the
Constitution.”).
4
BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 15 (2010)
(“[O]ver the course of two centuries, the most dangerous branch has turned out to be the
presidency . . . .”); Martin S. Flaherty, The Most Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725,
1821 (1996) (“[E]ven the most glancing survey indicates that the executive branch long ago
supplanted its legislative counterpart as the most powerful––and therefore most dangerous–
in the sense that the Founders meant.”).
5
See ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 181-88 (advocating that Congress, among other
institutions, must directly address executive overreach); Flaherty, supra note 4, at 1828-39
(arguing judiciary should more robustly police separation of powers violations and Congress
should more closely monitor executive by exercising its veto power and passing statutory
items limiting executive removal power).
6
PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? 6 (2014).
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The modern predominance of executive power is one of the most significant
embarrassments to James Madison’s vision of the Constitution.7 Interconnected
with the rise of executive power—part cause, part effect, part exacerbator—is a
second great embarrassment to the Madisonian vision: the rise of political
parties. Madison assumed that the branches of government would have their own
inherent and internal ambitions, with “[a]mbition . . . made to counteract
ambition.”8 In a path-breaking article, Daryl Levinson and Richard Pildes show
that this supposed adversarial tension between the legislature and the executive
has been “displaced by competition between [the] two major parties.”9 Whereas
Madison envisioned the political branches checking one another, in practice, the
character—even the very existence—of their competition is largely a function
of whether they are controlled by the same or different parties.10 In periods of
divided government, the Madisonian regime is in evidence, but one might say it
functions too well, as the “check” becomes a near complete barrier, leaving the
president the choice between paralysis and overreaching. And in periods of
unified government, the check largely disappears.
We do not contest this account. Our concern, rather, is with a common
response to executive domination that is wholly misplaced. In the face of
executive dominance and inconsistent congressional checking, scholars often
articulate the view, not that the executive is too powerful in some absolute sense,
but rather that the contemporary executive branch “toppl[es] . . . the framers’
tripartite system.”11 In response, some jurists and scholars propose reorganizing
and/or eliminating functions of the executive branch to bring its operations into
line. They contend that the separation-of-powers principles that determine the
structure of the federal government as a whole apply with full force to the
distribution and combination of powers within the executive branch.12 On this
account, separation-of-powers law prohibits the accumulation of more than one

7
Madison argued that the “the weakness of the executive” required that it be “fortified,”
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 322-23 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961), against a
legislature that is “everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into
its impetuous vortex,” THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra, at 309 (James Madison). See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra, at 301 (James Madison).
8
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 7, at 322 (James Madison).
9
Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 2311, 2313 (2006).
10
Id. at 2329-30.
11
JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 54 (2017) [hereinafter MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP].
12
As Gillian Metzger notes, internal separation-of-powers principles could also be applied
to the legislature and the judiciary. Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent Relationship
Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423, 428 & n.21 (2009)
[hereinafter Metzger, Interdependent]. However, the focus of the internal separation of
powers literature is the executive branch, and, like Metzger, we use “internal separation of
powers” to refer to separation within the executive branch.
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type of power—legislative, executive, and judicial—in the same official or
government entity. We refer to this as the anti-accumulation principle.
The anti-accumulation principle has intuitive appeal. Within our
constitutional tradition, the prohibition on the accumulation of more than one
type of governmental power in any single official or entity would appear to be
fundamental. In one widely quoted passage in The Federalist No. 47, James
Madison appears to say as much: “The accumulation of all powers, legislative,
executive, and judiciary, in the same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the
very definition of tyranny.”13
Over the past decade, the anti-accumulation principle has been endorsed by
Supreme Court Justices, other prominent jurists, and scholars. Justice Gorsuch,
echoing Justice Scalia,14 and with the support of Justices Thomas, Alito, and
Kavanaugh,15 has invoked this principle as a basis for challenging administrative
law doctrines requiring judicial deference to agencies.16 Chief Justice Roberts,
too, has expressed general support for the anti-accumulation principle.17 These
Justices have built, sometimes explicitly, on scholars who have elaborated the
idea that the Constitution contains an independent separation-of-powers
prohibition on the accumulation of different types of powers in the same hands.18
13

See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James Madison).
Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 619 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(criticizing Auer deference on the ground that implying that “[an] agency can resolve
ambiguities in its own regulations . . . would violate a fundamental principle of separation of
powers—that the power to write a law and the power to interpret it cannot rest in the same
hands” (citing Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997))).
15
See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2437 (2019) (identifying Justices who joined
Justice Gorsuch’s opinion).
16
See id. at 2437-39 (Gorsuch, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, J., and in relevant part
by Alito & Kavanaugh, JJ.) (“Auer thus means that, far from being ‘kept distinct,’ the powers
of making, enforcing, and interpreting laws are united in the same hands—and in the process
a cornerstone of the rule of law is compromised.”); see also Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834
F.3d 1142, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“Under [Chevron’s] terms, an
administrative agency may set and revise policy (legislative), override adverse judicial
determinations (judicial), and exercise enforcement discretion (executive). . . . It’s an
arrangement . . . that seems pretty hard to square with the Constitution of the founders’
design . . . .” (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984))).
17
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 312-13 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[A]s
a practical matter [administrative agencies] exercise legislative power, by promulgating
regulations with the force of law; executive power, by policing compliance with those
regulations; and judicial power, by adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions
on those found to have violated their rules. The accumulation of these powers in the same
hands is not an occasional or isolated exception to the constitutional plan; it is a central feature
of modern American government.”).
18
See, e.g., John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 654 (1996) [hereinafter Manning,
Constitutional Structure] (invoking “the constitutional premise that lawmaking and law14
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The implications of applying the anti-accumulation principle to the executive
branch as a matter of separation-of-powers law are vast. At a minimum, doing
so would introduce a new wave of constitutional policing of agencies’ internal
organization and powers. The principle is present—sometimes front and center,
sometimes lurking in the background—in contemporary debates over the
agencies’ combination of functions,19 removal protections for independent
agencies,20 the appointment of Administrative Law Judges (“ALJs”),21 and the
Attorney General’s “Refer and Review” authority in immigration.22 Even more
consequentially, it could require a dramatic sheering of the powers vested in
many administrative agencies. For many proponents of this principle, that is
exactly the point.23
This Article argues that the anti-accumulation principle, as applied internal to
the executive branch or as a basis for challenging doctrines governing judicial
review of agency action, misunderstands separation-of-powers law. No antiaccumulation principle prohibits the combination of powers exercised by the
executive branch.24 The Constitution provides modest constraints on the internal
exposition must be distinct” to critique Auer); Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S.
50, 69 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing id.); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the
Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1248 (1994) (“In Madison’s famous words,
‘[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands,
whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly
be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.’ The destruction of this principle of separation
of powers is perhaps the crowning jewel of the modern administrative revolution.” (footnote
omitted) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James Madison))).
19
See Lawson, supra note 18, at 1248-49 (examining how combination of executive,
legislative, and judicial functions in agency violates separation of powers).
20
See Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203-04 (2020) (striking down removal
protections for Director of CFPB while noting, with evident concern, that Director “may
unilaterally . . . issue final regulations, oversee adjudications, set enforcement priorities,
[and] initiate prosecutions”).
21
See infra text accompanying notes 176-84.
22
See infra text accompanying notes 185-98.
23
See, e.g., HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 7 (contending that administrative power and law
is unlawful).
24
In Touby v. United States, a unanimous Supreme Court, with Justice O’Connor writing,
flatly rejected application of separation of powers internal to the branches: “The principle of
separation of powers focuses on the distribution of powers among the three coequal Branches,
see Mistretta, . . . ; it does not speak to the manner in which authority is parceled out within a
single Branch.” 500 U.S. 160, 167-68 (1991) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361,
382 (1989)). We aim to develop, in light of resurgent arguments for application of separation
of powers internal to the executive branch, a full argument for the Court’s position in Touby.
John Manning argues more generally that “the Constitution adopts no freestanding principle
of separation of powers.” John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary Interpretation,
124 HARV. L. REV. 1939, 1944 (2011) [hereinafter Manning, Ordinary Interpretation].
Manning defends this position based on an examination of a broad array of historical sources
and practices. Id. at 1978-85. We focus more narrowly on the invocation of one specific
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structure of the branches; for instance, Congress must have two houses25 and the
President must appoint principal officers of the United States.26 In other respects,
it anticipates or authorizes particular structures; for instance, that the executive
branch include principal and inferior officers,27 or that the judiciary include
(optional) inferior courts in addition to the (mandatory) Supreme Court.28 But
other than these modest constraints, internal structures are left to Congress
(primarily through the Necessary and Proper Clause29 and, with regard to itself,
the Rules of Proceedings Clause)30 and the branches themselves. While the
three-branch structure of the federal government as a whole of course reflects a
general anti-accumulation idea, it is a large and unjustified step to conclude that
such an anti-accumulation principle applies internally to the executive branch.31
The text most often invoked to justify such a step is found not in the
Constitution (because no such text is to be found there) but in Madison’s
statement in The Federalist No. 47 that “[t]he accumulation of all
powers . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”32 This is a
profound misreading, one that overlooks Madison’s insistence that this maxim
“has been totally misconceived and misapplied” and so illustrates the very error
Madison cautions against.33 In The Federalist No. 47, Madison is at pains to
show that blending of powers is consistent with separation of powers, not the
opposite.34
Nor is such a principle justified on functionalist grounds.35 Federal agencies
operate within a complicated and powerful web of checks and constraints, not
least from the three constitutional branches themselves.

freestanding separation-of-powers principle, the anti-accumulation principle, and its
application internally to the executive branch.
25
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives.”).
26
Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States . . . .”).
27
Id. (vesting nomination of principal “Officers” in President, and granting power to
Congress to vest nomination of “inferior Officers . . . in the President alone, in the Courts of
Law, or in the Heads of Departments”).
28
Id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish.”); see also id. art. I, § 8, cl. 9 (empowering Congress to create lower courts).
29
U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 18.
30
Id. § 5, cl 2.
31
See Manning, Ordinary Interpretation, supra note 24, at 1950-58, 1996 (arguing against
invoking principles of higher level of generality in separation of powers).
32
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James Madison).
33
Id.
34
See id. at 302-03 (stressing that separation of powers is subverted by exercise of “whole
power” of one branch by another).
35
See infra Section II.C (discussing functional arguments).
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Beyond rejecting the application of the anti-accumulation principle internally
to the executive branch, this Article aims to clarify proper constitutional terms
of argument over the growth of the executive in two ways. First, we note that
the concerns animating invocation of this principle frequently are issues of due
process, such as notice of the law and the right to a fair hearing. Indeed, in some
cases, the anti-accumulation arguments simply collapse into due process claims
under a separation-of-powers label. Intertwining separation-of-powers claims
with due process concerns does not strengthen the separation-of-powers
arguments. But it does suggest that the proper constitutional foothold to address
the concerns animating these objections is due process, and they should be
evaluated as due process questions.
Second, the underlying point that a freestanding separation-of-powers
principle does not apply internally to the executive branch has implications for
a variety of scholars who embrace separation of powers as a vocabulary for
understanding and advocating for reform of the executive branch. Jon Michaels,
for example, contends that “a separation of powers within the administrative
arena is in many respects even more important than is a separation of powers
within the traditional constitutional area.”36 Under the heading of internal
separation of powers, Neal Katyal advocates for strengthening civil service
protections as a source of friction and resistance to the abuse of power.37 The
separation-of-powers vocabulary of these and other scholars creates the
impression—even if disclaimed by the writers themselves—that a general
principle of separation-of-powers law regulates the internal structure of the
executive branch. Talk of separation of powers, even at the highest level of
abstraction, implicitly provides a menu for thinking about internal executive
branch constraint that is unhelpful and often misleading. Not only is such
internal separation of powers wrong doctrinally but it also should not be a
primary vocabulary or tool kit for constraints on the executive branch.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I documents the longer tradition of
invoking an anti-accumulation principle, grounded in The Federalist No. 47, to
challenge the internal structure of the executive branch, and notes its prominent
contemporary advocates. Part II makes the case that there is no antiaccumulation principle of separation of powers that applies internal to the
executive branch. What invocations of an anti-accumulation principle need is
precisely what Madison and the constitutional design deny: a principle that the
separation of powers present between the three branches of government must be
replicated within any branch. Part II also argues that functional considerations—
like fairness, avoiding faction, and efficiency—do not justify the antiaccumulation principle. Part III turns to the ways in which the anti-accumulation
principle is invoked to challenge judicial doctrines and particular institutional
arrangements in the executive branch. It shows not only that the separation-ofpowers elements of these challenges lack merit but also that frequently they are
36
37

MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP, supra note 11, at 19.
Katyal, supra note 2, at 2331-35.
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animated by due process concerns. While sometimes constitutional clauses can
combine to strengthen constitutional arguments, due process does not save the
anti-accumulation principle or its applications. Rather, due process concerns,
especially those concerning the separation of prosecutorial and adjudicative
roles, should be addressed as such. Part IV shows more generally the ways in
which the separation-of-powers vocabulary, while useful in some respects, also
has costs and limits the menu for executive branch reform.
I.

THE ANTI-ACCUMULATION PRINCIPLE

The anti-accumulation principle has two basic elements. First, it asserts that
principles of separation of powers applicable to the structure of the federal
government as a whole also apply within the executive branch. The antiaccumulation principle thus would operate as a principle of internal separation
of powers, in the sense that it applies internally to the executive branch. Second,
as to the content of this internal separation-of-powers principle, the antiaccumulation principle asserts a constitutional prohibition on the accumulation
or consolidation of more than one type of power—legislative, executive,
judicial—in any single official or government entity. The anti-accumulation
principle first developed in challenges to the combination of functions in
administrative agencies and has more recently been invoked to attack judicial
doctrines.
Gary Lawson’s 1994 formulation of the anti-accumulation principle and its
application to the executive branch have gained a considerable following and
provide a helpful point of entry.38 Lawson begins, as do so many iterations of
this point, by quoting James Madison’s famous statement in The Federalist No.
47: “[T]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in
the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of
tyranny.”39 Administrative agencies, Lawson then observes, “routinely combine
all three governmental functions in the same body, and even in the same people
within that body.”40 Lawson vividly depicts this combination with reference to
the Federal Trade Commission:
The Commission promulgates substantive rules of conduct. The
Commission then considers whether to authorize investigations into
whether the Commission’s rules have been violated. If the Commission
authorizes an investigation, the investigation is conducted by the
Commission, which reports its findings to the Commission. If the
Commission thinks that the Commission’s findings warrant an
enforcement action, the Commission issues a complaint. The

38

Lawson, supra note 18, at 1248-49 (section entitled “The Death of Separation of
Powers”).
39
Id. at 1248 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James Madison)).
40
Id.
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Commission’s complaint that a Commission rule has been violated is then
prosecuted by the Commission and adjudicated by the Commission. This
Commission adjudication can either take place before the full Commission
or before a semi-autonomous Commission administrative law judge. If the
Commission chooses to adjudicate before an administrative law judge
rather than before the Commission and the decision is adverse to the
Commission, the Commission can appeal to the Commission.41
For Lawson, this combination of functions amounts to the “destruction”42 of
the principle of separation of powers and is the “most jarring way in which the
administrative state departs from the Constitution,”43 which for him is saying a
lot.
Notice that this objection is distinct from the claim that it is unconstitutional
for agencies to exercise the legislative and judicial powers they typically
possess. Lawson also makes that argument.44 But he treats the combination of
functions internal to agencies as a distinct violation of a freestanding separationof-powers principle. Of course, problems with unconstitutional delegation and
combination of functions are related. Combination arises only where more than
one type of constitutional power is exercised. As a result, for an executive officer
or agency to exercise combined powers requires that it have been granted
legislative and/or judicial powers. Once that (unconstitutional, in Lawson’s
view) grant of legislative or judicial powers has taken place, the objection is that
the combination of those powers creates a distinct and further violation of the
constitutional principle of separation of powers.45
Lawson’s formulation of this objection is part of a long-standing strain of
thought. The canonical text is The Federalist No. 47, with its irresistable line
about “the very definition of tyranny.”46 Looming behind Madison is
Montesquieu, particularly a passage quoted in part in The Federalist No. 47:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person,
or in the same body of magistrates, there can be no liberty . . . .
Again, there is no liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from
the legislative and executive. Were it joined with the legislative, the life
and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control; for the
judge would be then the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power,
the judge might behave with violence and oppression.
There would be an end of everything, were the same man or the same
body, whether of the nobles or of the people, to exercise those three powers,
41

Id.
Id.
43
Id. at 1249.
44
See id. at 1237-48 (unconstitutional delegation of legislative power and unconstitutional
grant of judicial power).
45
Id. at 1249 (combination of functions separately violates separation of powers).
46
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James Madison).
42
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that of enacting laws, that of executing the public resolutions, and of trying
the causes of individuals.47
Throughout the twentieth century, and even before,48 critics have invoked
Madison in The Federalist No. 47 or Montesquieu to make the case that the
internal allocation of authority within the executive branch violated separation
of powers. Writing in the late 1930s, for example, Robert Cushman considered
the already lengthy pedigree of this objection.49 He observed that “[e]very
independent commission which has exercised any substantial regulatory power
has been sharply attacked on this same ground.”50 Indeed, the late 1930s was a
period of particular contention regarding the combination of functions.51 As the

47
11 CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 151-52
(Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Pub. Co. 1949) (1748) (emphasis added); see Rebecca L.
Brown, Separation of Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1534-35 (1991).
48
Congressional debate over the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission
included quite modern-sounding objections on these grounds. For example, Representative
Oates stated:
I believe that it is absolutely unconstitutional and void, because to my mind it is a
blending of the legislative, the judicial, and perhaps, the executive powers of the
Government in the same law. . . . In other words, the power of suspending the law is to
be vested in the commissioners who are charged with construing the scope of the
provisions of this bill, and the powers with which it invests them as well as with the
execution of it. All these powers are concentrated in the same body of officers.
18 Cong. Rec. 824, 848 (1887) (statement of Rep. William Oates).
49
Robert E. Cushman, Constitutional Status of the Independent Regulatory Commissions,
24 CORNELL L.Q. 13, 15-21 (1938).
50
Id. at 19.
51
For example, a published JSD dissertation by Ward Lattin developed the point at book
length (concluding, interestingly, that the solution was to separate functions within agencies).
WARD E. LATTIN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY AGENCIES AND THE DOCTRINE OF
THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1938). This passage is typical:
Extensive exercise of the three distinct powers are placed in the same hands, with the
result that instead of the greatest practical separation we have a most impracticable union
of powers. It is this precise thing that the framers of the Constitution quite unanimously
agreed was the very definition of tyranny.
And if it was tyranny than [sic] it is tyranny now!
Id. at 27; see also J. ROLAND PENNOCK, ADMINISTRATION AND THE RULE OF LAW 33 (1941)
(finding it “clear that the combination of the various powers into one agency without the
proper safeguards may be very dangerous indeed”); ROSCOE POUND, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
ITS GROWTH, PROCEDURE, AND SIGNIFICANCE 54-55 (1942) (“The polity proposed by some,
in which there is to be a fourth department, the administrative, in which full legislative,
administrative, and judicial power is to be concentrated, is a reversion to the seventeenth and
eighteenth-century type of absolute government, on the model of the old regime in France,
and to the type of government in colonial America which led to the Revolution.”); O.R.
McGuire, Federal Administrative Action and Judicial Review, 22 A.B.A. J. 492, 492-93
(1936); O.R. McGuire, Administrative Lawmaking, 185 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI.
73, 83 (1936) (objecting to the combination of functions within administrative agencies and
noting concern over resulting arbitrary decisions).

2022]

FALSE ALLURE

937

federal bureaucracy ballooned, so did the number of agencies with combined
functions.52
Perhaps the most prominent attack during the New Deal period came from the
American Bar Association (“ABA”). The ABA’s Special Committee on
Administrative Law, established in 1933 and chaired first by O.R. McGuire and
then by Roscoe Pound, pressed hard for a decade for legislative change.53 The
Committee’s primary concern was administrative adjudication, and its central
proposal was creation of a single administrative court for all agency
adjudication.54 While “identifying constitutional infirmities with expanding
administrative government was not the Special Committee’s focus,”55 it
repeatedly stressed the separation-of-powers point. In its 1936 report, for
example, the Committee quoted the Supreme Court to the effect that separation
of powers “is not merely a matter of convenience” but rather “basic and vital,”56
and then complained:
Paradoxically, it is precisely this forbidden commingling of the essentially
different powers of government in the same hands that is today the
identifying badge of an administrative agency. For years, the actual
development was obscured by a variety of euphemisms, such as “quasilegislative,” “quasi-judicial,” and “administrative,” sometimes with the
implication that a fourth power of government was involved, not subject to
the constitutional safeguards imposed on the other three. Little if any
distinction was made between executive, legislative, and judicial functions

52
For many the combination of functions was a feature, not a bug. See, e.g., JAMES M.
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 11-12 (1938) (“[W]hen government concerns itself
with the stability of an industry it is only intelligent realism for it to follow the industrial rather
than the political analogue. It vests the necessary powers with the administrative authority it
creates, not too greatly concerned with the extent to which such action does violence to the
traditional tripartite theory of government organization.”).
53
See generally Gillian E. Metzger, Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State
Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 57-59 (2017) [hereinafter Metzger, 1930s Redux]
(examining the origins of the ABA Special Committee); Dan Ernst, The Special Committee
on Administrative Law, LEGAL HIST. BLOG (Sept. 27, 2008, 12:38 PM),
http://legalhistoryblog.blogspot.com/2008/09/special-committee-on-administrative-law.html
[https://perma.cc/DF9F-FSK7] (recounting history of ABA’s criticism and distrust of
administrative agencies).
54
Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 53, at 58.
55
Id. In this respect, Metzger contrasts the Committee with the Liberty League, a
ferociously anti-New Deal organization active from 1934 to 1940. Id. That organization seems
not to have much focused on the separation-of-powers arguments. See Jared A. Goldstein,
The American Liberty League and the Rise of Constitutional Nationalism, 86 TEMP. L. REV.
287, 288-89 (2014) (“[T]he Liberty League argued for a return to what the movement
identified as the fundamental national values of self-reliance, individualism, hard work,
property rights, and freedom from government . . . .”).
56
Report of the Special Committee on Administrative Law, 61 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 720, 727
(1936) (quoting O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933)).
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when exercised by administrative agencies; the tendency was to confuse
them and to treat them alike.57
The surge of separation-of-powers objections during the New Deal led to
legislative requirements for separation of functions within agencies in the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”).58 Based on the principle that a
prosecutor cannot be an impartial judge,59 the APA keeps adjudication apart
from investigation and prosecution by requiring that those tasks be performed
by different people.60 ALJs cannot “be responsible to or subject to the
supervision or direction of” enforcement staff,61 nor can they have
communications with the enforcement staff relevant to the subject of their
adjudications.62 The APA did not create a scheme of complete separation
because the heads of agencies were still vested with ultimate authority on
adjudications, investigations, enforcement, and rulemaking63 Below that level,
strict separation of adjudicative and prosecutorial staff is required.
Although the compromise reflected in the APA did not satisfy everyone, for
fifty years it seemed that the matter was reasonably settled. In a particular
proceeding, the combination of functions—particularly that of judge and
prosecutor—might create a plausible, or even actual, APA or due process

57

Id.; see also O.R. McGuire, Administrative Law and American Democracy, 25 A.B.A.
J. 393, 394 (1939) (“Should our present tri-partite system continue to weaken, we are faced
with the only possible alternatives of anarchy or the introduction of the final phase of
Utopianism, a form of government on the Russian, Italian or German models—and let no one
tell you the contrary.”).
58
Most importantly, the Administrative Procedure Act, adopted in 1946, carves out
protection for ALJs from influence by, or involvement with, investigators and prosecutors
within the agency. 5 U.S.C. § 554(d); see Michael Asimow, When the Curtain Falls:
Separation of Functions in the Federal Administrative Agencies, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 759, 76179 (1981); see also U.S. DOJ, FINAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S COMMITTEE ON
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 55-60 (1941) [hereinafter FINAL REPORT] (recommending
structural protections of hearing examiners in order to “insure internal but nevertheless real
and actual separation of the adjudicating and prosecuting or investigating functions”); Joanna
Grissinger, Law in Action: The Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure,
20 J. POL. HIST. 379, 384-86 (2008) (discussing the committee’s proposals for separation of
adjudicatory and prosecutorial functions within agencies). The separation of functions
provisions are one instance of a general characteristic of the APA, viz., that it embodies a set
of compromises to allow agencies to function while still protecting against what Roscoe
Pound termed “administrative absolutism.” See POUND, supra note 51, at 28, 36; see also
Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the
Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 24-25 (2001).
59
See FINAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 56.
60
Id.
61
See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2).
62
See id. § 554(d)(1).
63
Asimow, supra note 58, at 761.

2022]

FALSE ALLURE

939

problem.64 But viewed as an issue of constitutional law, it was widely accepted
that combination of functions in individual agencies does not violate the
constitutional principle of separation of powers.65 Accordingly, in 1994, Lawson
lamented that agencies’ combination of functions “typically does not even raise
eyebrows” and “[t]he post-New Deal Supreme Court has never seriously
questioned the constitutionality of this combination of functions in agencies.”66
Yet in the quarter century since, the idea of an anti-accumulation principle
that invalidates combinations of functions has gained considerably more
adherents. Scholars from otherwise opposed perspectives have pressed these
challenges. Consider Professors Michael Dorf and Charles Sabel, on the one
hand, and Philip Hamburger, on the other. In arguing for decentralization of
government power generally, Dorf and Sabel contend that agencies’
combination of functions violates separation of powers.67 Like Lawson, they
invoke a Madisonian principle, drawn from The Federalist No. 47, prohibiting
“the combination of executive, legislative, and judicial power in one branch of
government.”68 In the context of a wholesale challenge to the legality of

64
See, e.g., Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 58 (1972) (holding due process
violated when mayor is responsible for village finances and major part of village income
derives from traffic convictions in mayor’s court); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 522-23
(1927) (holding mayor’s personal financial interest in obtaining convictions in traffic court
disqualifies him as disinterested adjudicator). As we discuss below, see infra text
accompanying note 227, courts are fairly accepting of the combination of functions
notwithstanding possible due process concerns. See Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47-48
(1975); Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683,
702 (1948). But see Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 46 (1950) (“But that the
safeguards [the APA] did set up were intended to ameliorate the evils from the commingling
of functions as exemplified here is beyond doubt.”). Such a concern will only arise in an
adjudication, not a rulemaking. Nat’l Small Shipments Traffic Conf., Inc. v. Interstate Com.
Comm’n, 725 F.2d 1442, 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“Neither federal statute nor the due process
clause imposes a general separation-of-functions requirement on informal rulemaking by an
agency.”); Lead Indus. Ass’n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
65
Metzger, 1930s Redux, supra note 53, at 60 (noting that “[b]y 1937, the Court had
implicitly sanctioned the combination of legislative, adjudicatory, and executive functions
against separation of powers attack”); Kevin M. Stack, Agency Independence After PCAOB,
32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2391, 2394-97 (2011) (noting that “[s]eparation-of-powers law has been
silent on the consolidation of functions within agencies” and that the Supreme Court “has not
held that combination of functions within the agency violates separation of powers”); cf.
Lawson, supra note 18, at 1249 (“The post-New Deal Supreme Court has never seriously
questioned the constitutionality of this combination of functions in agencies.”). For an explicit
rejection of the separation-of-functions objection under a state constitution, see Hickenbottom
v. McCain, 181 S.W.2d 226, 229 (Ark. 1944).
66
Lawson, supra note 18, at 1249; see also Brown, supra note 47, at 1556 (noting the
“remarkable point . . . that the Supreme Court has never seriously questioned the validity of
the commingling of legislative, executive, and judicial functions” in individual agencies).
67
Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267, 438-39 (1998).
68
Id. at 438.
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administrative governance, Professor Hamburger objects to the administrative
agencies’ combination of functions in exactly the same terms. Noting that
Montesquieu justified specialization of powers to prevent arbitrary decision
making, Hamburger writes, “the combination of powers often leaves Americans
at the mercy of administrative agencies.”69 When agencies have combined
functions, Hamburger continues, “they come to enjoy a nearly freestanding
coercive power, only distantly limited by the external formalities of authorizing
statutes and deferential judicial decisions.”70
These objections have also been raised in a growing number of concurring
and dissenting opinions, both on the Supreme Court and in the lower courts, that
challenge specific doctrines. Perhaps the most prominent and general judicial
endorsement of the combination-of-functions objection appears in Chief Justice
Roberts’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Kennedy and Alito, in City of
Arlington v. FCC.71 There, the Chief Justice began with the go-to quote from
The Federalist No. 4772 before lamenting that “[a]lthough modern
administrative agencies fit most comfortably within the Executive Branch, as a
practical matter they exercise legislative power . . . executive power . . . and
judicial power.”73 While the opinion stops well short of taking a view on the
constitutionality of administrative agencies, the Chief Justice does note that this
“accumulation” fits poorly with the “constitutional plan.”74 Similarly, in Seila
Law LLC v. CFPB,75 the Chief Justice invoked the combination of functions of
the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau as part of the grounds

69

HAMBURGER, supra note 6, at 335. Hamburger’s work cites Pound and is reminiscent of
Pound’s assertion that the modern American administrative state is a return to the evils of the
British monarchy circa the 18th century, a central feature of which, of course, was the
concentration of power in one person, with no countervailing ambition to counter the king’s.
POUND, supra note 51, at 54-55. For an even more explicit invocation of the monarchical
comparison, see generally F. H. BUCKLEY, THE ONCE AND FUTURE KING: THE RISE OF CROWN
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICA (2015).
70
Hamburger, supra note 6, at 335; see also Philip A. Hamburger, Vermeule Unbound, 94
TEX. L. REV. 205, 220 (2016) (noting that statutory requirements of separation of functions
within agencies leave the glass “half empty,” which “is a dangerous threat to due process”);
David McIntosh & William J. Haun, The Separation of Powers in an Administrative State, in
LIBERTY’S NEMESIS: THE UNCHECKED EXPANSION OF THE STATE 239, 240 (Dean Reuter &
John Yoo eds., 2016) (similar objection); Richard Murphy & Afsheen John Radsan, Notice
and an Opportunity to Be Heard Before the President Kills You, 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
829, 876 (2013) (stating that combination of functions is a “seemingly wholesale violation of
separation of powers”); Richard A. Epstein, Why the Administrative State Is Inconsistent with
the Rule of Law, 3 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 491, 496 (2008) (rejecting the “claim that the
Constitution authorizes the creation of independent agencies with aggregated powers of a
legislative, executive, and judicial nature”).
71
569 U.S. 290, 312-13 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
72
Id. at 312 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James Madison)).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 313.
75
140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
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for invalidating the Director’s protection from removal.76 In other opinions, as
we address below,77 Supreme Court Justices invoke these ideas as a basis for
challenging deference doctrines. Other critics invoke them to challenge how
adjudication is performed in the executive branch.
II.

THE ANTI-ACCUMULATION PRINCIPLE AND SEPARATION OF POWERS

This Part makes the case against the application of an anti-accumulation
principle to the executive branch. In the absence of an actual provision in the
text, the principle must be teased out of structural understandings. Most of those
who do so are formalists; accordingly, this Part begins by arguing that a formal
approach to separation of powers does not justify applying an anti-accumulation
principle. Nor does The Federalist No. 47. This Part then argues that the
accumulation of powers within an executive branch department or agency also
is unproblematic under a more functional approach. In short, there is no antiaccumulation principle as a matter of constitutional law.
A.

A Constitutional Prohibition on Accumulation?

Most defenders of the anti-accumulation principle associate their views with
formalism.78 As such, they first determine what type of governmental power is
being exercised and then insist that the entity exercising it be part of the
constitutionally established branch vested with the relevant power.79 But the
formalist argument against agency combination of functions fails on its own
terms.
First, the premise—that the Constitution bars commingling of powers—is
overstated. Formalists view the constitutional scheme as one of rigid, siloed
separation. The Constitution establishes distinct branches, each with its own
task; therefore these powers cannot be blended within any given entity. The
Constitution, however, does not assign exclusive tasks to each branch, as every

76
Id. at 2190, 2202, 2203-04 (noting that framers sought to “prevent the ‘gradual
concentration’ of power in the same hands” and that the Director had been vested with powers
to “issue final regulations, oversee adjudications, . . . [and] initiate prosecutions,” an
accumulation which the Court treated as strengthening the challenge to the Director’s removal
protection (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 7, at 321 (James Madison))).
77
See infra Section VI.A (addressing invocation of these arguments to challenge deference
doctrines).
78
The leading example is surely self-described “fanatical” formalist Gary Lawson. See
Gary Lawson, Prolegomenon to Any Future Administrative Law Course: Separation of
Powers and the Transcendental Deduction, 49 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 885, 888 (2005) (“[V]irtually
the entire structure of the modern administrative state is either suspect or flagrantly
unconstitutional under any plausible formalist account.”).
79
See, e.g., id. at 888-89.
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observer since Madison has acknowledged.80 The president’s veto power, his
role in proposing legislation, and his ability to adjourn Congress are
“legislative,” as is the vice president’s role as president of the Senate; the
Senate’s powers to confirm nominees and approve treaties are “executive”
(unless the president’s role in negotiating treaties is “legislative”); the House’s
impeachment power is executive; the Senate’s “sole power” to try impeachments
is judicial (alternatively the Chief Justice’s role in presiding over presidential
impeachment trials is “legislative”); and so on. The Constitution actually
mingles powers quite a bit. Indeed, a prominent contemporary objection to the
proposed Constitution was that it did so too much; but the strict separationists
lost that argument.81 It is still accurate to say that it does not mingle them as
much as one finds at the top of a typical administrative agency, and perhaps that
is the point. But it is far too simple to just note that the Constitution separates
powers and agencies combine them.
Second, commingling at the agency level leaves the constitutional regime of
separate powers entirely intact. Pursuant to that regime, Congress has passed
legislation that created, empowered, constrained, and approved these agency
structures.82 It could eliminate them tomorrow. And through actual, threatened,
80
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 7, at 308 (James Madison) (noting that unless
the three “departments be so far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional
control over the others, the degree of separation which the [separation-of-powers] maxim
requires . . . can never in practice be duly maintained”). In the words of Lloyd Cutler, given
all the intermingling, “[t]he followers of Montesquieu at the Philadelphia Convention at best
won half a Loaf.” Lloyd N. Cutler, Some Reflections About Divided Government, 18
PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 485, 485 (1988) (describing the constitutional regime as “much more
a sharing of powers than . . . a separation of powers”). We discuss Madison’s endorsement of
blended powers more fully below in regard to misreadings of The Federalist No. 47. See infra
Section II.B.
81
See, e.g., Cutler, supra note 80, at 485 (“[I]t is the fact that they did not achieve this sort
of pristine separation that Montesquieu talked about, that was the principal ground of attack
upon the Constitution during the ratification process.”); William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy
of the Separation of Powers and the Federal Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 480-81
(1989) (describing objections to the Constitution on this ground).
82
For some skeptics, the simple fact that agencies are created through and by the three
constitutionally separated powers itself refutes the arguments of the Gary Lawsons of the
world. See Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The Unbearable Rightness of Auer, 84 U.
CHI. L. REV. 297, 311-12 (2017) (“The separation of powers is fully satisfied so long as the
principal institutions set out in the Constitution—Congress, president, and judiciary—
exercising their prescribed functions, devise and approve the scheme of agency authority that
combines rulemaking and rule-interpreting power in the agency’s hands. . . . If the
constitutional institutions, operating as they were set up to operate, have decided that such an
arrangement is both valid and wise, then respect for the separation of powers counsels
approval of the arrangement.”); Adrian Vermeule, No, 93 TEX. L. REV. 1547, 1564 (2015)
(reviewing PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW UNLAWFUL? (2014)) (“Where on
earth does Hamburger think combined agency functions come from? The combination of
functions in agencies results from the operation of the system of separated legislative,
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or feared interventions, the three constitutional branches all impose meaningful
oversight on agencies, exercising that power separately.
Third, like all formalist arguments, this one is subject to a formalist response:
the supposed constitutional violation is simply not possible. On the standard
formalist account, agencies always and by definition exercise only executive
power. That is all they do and all they can do. As Justice Scalia put it in City of
Arlington v. FCC,83 when agencies make rules and conduct adjudications, “these
activities take ‘legislative’ and ‘judicial’ forms, but they are exercises of—
indeed, under our constitutional structure they must be exercises of—the
‘executive Power.’”84 From this perspective, the reason is straightforward: the
Constitution does not permit officers of the executive branch—which agencies
are—to exercise either Congress’s “legislative” power, or the judiciary’s
“judicial” power. The Constitution vests “[a]ll legislative Powers . . . in a
Congress,”85 and in Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns,86 Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, declared that “[t]his text permits no delegation of those
powers.”87 If no legislative power may be constitutionally delegated, then
agencies never (constitutionally) exercise legislative power. So too with judicial

executive, and judicial powers.”); Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L.
REV. 673, 691-92 (2015) [hereafter Vermeule, Optimal Abuse]. Vermeule and Sunstein are
not arguing that the combination of functions is constitutional simply because it was set up
and approved by the three branches. That argument eliminates judicial review. Rather, their
claim is the narrower one that a separation-of-powers challenge in particular (not any claim
of unconstitutionality) is unavailable against a structure that is itself the product of the
constitutionally mandatory participation and agreement of the separate powers. Constitutional
requirements have been met and purposes served by the process that produced the
combination. We wonder whether this may still be too large a claim; taken to its full extension,
it might mean that every judicial decision finding a statutory separation-of-powers violation
was wrongly decided. In any event, for the reasons given in the rest of this article, we end up
the same place as Sunstein and Vermeule even if from their point of view we have gone the
long way round.
83
569 U.S. 290 (2013).
84
Id. at 304 n.4 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1); see also United States v. Shreveport
Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932). This understanding is also central, for example,
to INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). If the veto is “legislation” and so a single House
cannot do it, why is it acceptable to leave it to the Attorney General, as Chadha did? See id.
at 953-54. The answer is that it is only “legislation” if Congress (or part of Congress) does it.
See id. at 953 n.16 (rejecting the argument that agency decision-making is an exercise of
legislative power, even though it may “resemble ‘legislative’ action”).
85
U.S. CONST. art I, § 1.
86
531 U.S. 457 (2001).
87
Id. at 472. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, took issue with this characterization.
Id. at 487-90 (Stevens, J., concurring) (calling for frank acknowledgement that agencies
exercise legislative power, a fact that gave him no pause at all as long as they did so pursuant
to a congressional delegation cabined by an intelligible principle). Of course, this view
garnered only two votes and runs directly counter to the formalist principles we are discussing
here.
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power. As the Court declared in Stern v. Marshall,88 Congress cannot confer
“the Government’s ‘judicial Power’ on entities outside Article III.”89 Therefore,
agency adjudication is not an exercise of the judicial power by definition.
Writing for three other Justices, Justice Kagan embraced this position in her
plurality opinion in Kisor v. Wilkie.90
The conclusion from these premises is hard to resist (in formalist terms): if
agencies cannot exercise “legislative power” (see Whitman) and cannot exercise
“judicial power” (see Stern v. Marshall), then whatever they do is an exercise of
executive power—and their combination of functions does not involve a
combination of powers. The formalist understanding that each branch may
exercise only its characteristic type of power precludes the possibility of an
agency exercising a combination of constitutional powers. Combination cannot
be a constitutional problem because it cannot be, period.91
This argument is formal in the extreme, perhaps convincing to property
lawyers in England in the seventeenth century but too formal even for some
committed contemporary formalists. The obvious functionalist response it to
contend that in effect agencies are exercising not only executive by also
legislative and judicial power. Recall the Chief Justice’s remark that “as a
practical matter” agencies do exercise legislative and judicial power.92 Suppose
we accept that characterization. What, then, is the constitutional problem in
formalist terms?
Most readily, it sounds in nondelegation. If an administrative agency is “as a
practical matter” exercising not only executive but also legislative and judicial
power, then, from the perspective of a formalist, there have been two
constitutional violations: the executive branch is doing work exclusively vested
with Congress and it is also doing work exclusively vested in the judiciary. As
88

564 U.S. 462 (2011).
Id. at 484. The Court has waffled on this point on some occasions. See, e.g., Freytag v.
Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 889 (1991) (“[T]he legislative courts possess and exercise judicial
power . . . although not conferred in virtue of the third article of the Constitution.” (quoting
Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 565-567 (1933))).
90
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019) (Kagan, J., joined by Breyer, Ginsburg, & Sotomayor, JJ.)
(“It does not violate the separation of powers, we have explained, because even when agency
‘activities take “legislative” and “judicial” forms,’ they continue to be ‘exercises of[] the
“executive Power”’—or otherwise said, ways of executing a statutory plan.” (alteration in
original) (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 304-05 (2013))).
91
See Jack M. Beermann, The Never-Ending Assault on the Administrative State, 93
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1599, 1607 (2018) (“[T]he accepted view is that agency heads may
employ all three forms of governmental action because, . . . as the Chadha Court recognized,
agencies are actually performing only executive functions when they make rules and
adjudicate whether the rules, or a statute, have been violated.”).
92
Arlington, 569 U.S. at 312 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see also Whitman, 531 U.S. at
488 (Stevens, J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority’s description of an EPA regulation
as an exercise of “executive power” and asserting that “it would be both wiser and more
faithful to what we have actually done in delegation cases to admit that agency rulemaking
authority is ‘legislative power’”).
89
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a logical matter if there is a combination of functions then there must have been
a delegation (one that is, for the formalist, unconstitutional). In this sense,
combination may work to flag a violation of the delegation doctrine. But the
combination itself is not the violation; at a minimum to describe it that way is a
form of double counting.
To conclude this Section, consider the following argument, or thought
experiment. The Constitution vests legislative authority in Congress; it also
divides the Congress into two houses.93 The latter was a conscious decision, part
and parcel of the separation of powers more generally. Indeed, for the framers,
the division between the House and Senate was absolutely central to the overall
structure of separated powers. In The Federalist No. 10, Madison stresses the
advantages of a large republic divided into states in avoiding the triumph of
faction.94 In The Federalist No. 51, he constructs a corresponding argument
about the separation of powers within the federal government.95 Bicameralism
was at the heart of this argument.96 For Madison, the House and the Senate were
themselves different “branches.”97 Given that under the Constitution legislation
must be enacted by a bicameral body, we might draw the lesson that when an
agency writes regulations—an essentially legislative task—it must recreate the
bicameral structure. Perhaps, for example, all agencies could have two heads:
say one who served at the pleasure of the president and one who could be fired
only for cause, whose mutual agreement was necessary for the promulgation of
a regulation. In this way we would ensure that the constitutional plan was being
observed.
To our knowledge, no one has made this argument. That is not a surprise; it
is not a very good argument. It has no textual basis; it creates a freestanding
requirement out of a particular structural arrangement that applies in a separate
and distinct context to other entities; and it is hard to see what would be
accomplished other than making regulations harder to produce. But in its method

93

See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 7, at 77 (James Madison).
95
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 7, at 322 (James Madison).
96
See id.
97
See id. (“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates.
The remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to
render them, by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little
connected with each other as the nature of their common functions and their common
dependence on the society will admit.”). As Larry Kramer explains, “Madison’s original
theory of constitutional enforcement was political in nature, and the ‘departments’ Madison
had in mind when he wrote about separation of powers were the House, the Senate, and the
Executive.” Larry D. Kramer, “The Interest of the Man”: James Madison, Popular
Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 697, 735
(2006); see also Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2203 (2020) (“[Having divided
the federal government into three branches, the framers] did not stop there. Most prominently,
the Framers bifurcated the federal legislative power into two Chambers: the House of
Representatives and the Senate . . . .”).
94
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and premises this argument is identical to the claims of those invoking the antiaccumulation principle. If separation of powers applies at the agency level, so
does bicameralism; they are equivalent principles—indeed, bicameralism is an
aspect of separation of powers. But bicameralism applies to Congress, not to
other governmental entities. So too for other instantiations of the principle of
separation of powers, such as the anti-accumulation principle.
B.

Misreading Madison

Proponents of the anti-accumulation principle have a problem: there just is no
piece of text on which to hang the argument. The Constitution contains no
separation of powers clause.98 It reflects separation-of-powers principles
through certain specific provisions but does not impose them beyond those
specific provisions.99
Undaunted, proponents of the anti-accumulation principle do routinely invoke
a text, almost as a matter of protocol. That text just is not in the Constitution.
Rather, it is Madison’s famous caution in The Federalist No. 47 against the
“accumulation” of “all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary . . . in the
same hands.”100 Stripped of its context, Madison’s highly quotable aphorism
appears to state a comprehensive rule of separation that would prohibit
combination of functions in agencies. But that is a flagrant misreading of The
Federalist No. 47. Madison’s basic point is that one branch must not exercise
the “whole” or the “complete” power of another branch, and that “the oracle,”
Montesquieu, did not propound a maxim prohibiting the blending of powers

98

See Manning, Ordinary Interpretation, supra note 24, at 1944 (noting that the
“Constitution contains no Separation of Powers Clause” and “adopts no freestanding
principle of separation of powers”). Gary Lawson and Patricia Granger argue that the
Necessary and Proper Clause provides a textual foundation for general separation-of-powers
principles in the design of government institutions. See Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Grander,
The ‘Proper’ Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping
Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 333-35 (1993). In particular, they suggest that for a law to be
“proper” for “carrying into execution the powers of any department of the national
government [it] must confine that department to its peculiar jurisdiction.” Id. at 333.
Accordingly, it might be argued that insofar as there exists (or existed) a freestanding
separation-of-powers principle that prohibits the combination of different types of
government power, that principle might be policed through the Necessary and Proper Clause’s
limitation on Congress. As argued in this Part, we do not believe there is such a freestanding
principle, and therefore no restriction to attend to in determining whether a law is “proper.”
99
Manning, Ordinary Interpretation, supra note 24, at 1944-45.
100
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James Madison).
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among the branches.101 Properly read, The Federalist No. 47 undercuts more
than it supports a freestanding principle of complete separation.102
The argument in The Federalist No. 47 is responsive. Madison seeks to
counter the objection that the Constitution does not adequately heed “the
political maxim that the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments ought
to be separate and distinct,” and goes too far in “blend[ing]” the powers among
the departments.103 The first step in Madison’s response is to forcefully endorse
the broad principle that the “accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive,
and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very
definition of tyranny.”104 Madison admits that if the federal Constitution were
“chargeable with this accumulation” it would be a decisive objection.105 But he
goes on to explain that “the maxim on which [this objection] relies has been
totally misconceived and misapplied.”106 Madison then devotes the remainder
of The Federalist No. 47 to explaining how this maxim has been misunderstood,
first in relation to Montesquieu and then in the context of the constitutions of the
states.107 Ironically, many modern invocations of the Madisonian principle do
not recognize that his point in The Federalist No. 47 was to argue against a broad
understanding of the principle, and in defense of the ways in which the federal
Constitution provides for only partial separation.
Madison recognized that the objection to the federal Constitution in his day,
like objections to combination of functions, derives from readings of
Montesquieu, “the oracle who is always consulted and cited” on this subject.108
As Madison points out, Montesquieu developed his principles of government
power in relation to the British Constitution109 (perhaps an idealized version of
it).110 Yet under the British Constitution, Madison explains, the legislative,
101

Id. at 303. Cf. Seila Law LLC, 140 S. Ct. at 2227 n.2 (Kagan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (noting that according to Madison, principle of separation of powers is
subverted only “where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands
which possess the whole power of another department” (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47,
supra note 7, at 302-03 (James Madison))).
102
Cf. Manning, Ordinary Interpretation, supra note 24, at 2004 (noting that Madison
provides no basis for a freestanding principle of separation that prohibits any blending and
mixing of powers among departments).
103
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James Madison); see also supra note 81
and accompanying text.
104
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James Madison).
105
Id.
106
Id.
107
See id. at 304.
108
Id. at 301.
109
See id. at 301-02.
110
See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND SEPARATION OF POWERS 93 (2d ed. 1998)
(“When Montesquieu wrote of ‘England’ . . . he was writing of an imaginary
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executive and judicial powers are “by no means totally separate and distinct from
each other.”111 Madison goes on to cite a host of ways in which the powers of
one branch are shared with others; for instance, not only is the executive
magistrate part of the legislative authority, but also one house of the legislature
is the sole repository of judicial power in cases of impeachment.112 Montesquieu
could not have been ignorant of these obvious features of the British
Constitution—rather, Madison writes, it was “[f]rom these facts” that
Montesquieu must be read.113 Specifically, Madison argues that when
Montesquieu writes that “‘[t]here can be no liberty where the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same person’ . . . he did not mean that these
departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of
each other.”114
In light of the blending of these powers in the British Constitution, Madison
argues that Montesquieu’s prohibition “can amount to no more than this, where
the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which
possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a
free constitution are subverted.”115 Madison makes very clear that he views
Montesquieu’s prohibition to apply to the exercise of the entire or whole power
of one branch by another. This maxim, Madison writes, would be violated in the
British context “if the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed
also the complete legislative power . . . or if the entire legislative body had
possessed the supreme judiciary . . . .”116 By the same token, the Madisonian
prohibition likewise does not bar the exercise by one branch of powers
characteristic of another, but rather the accumulation of “all powers” or the
“entire” or “complete” power of the legislature, executive, or judiciary “in the
same hands.”117

country . . . Montesquieu’s statements in this chapter differ considerably from what he
actually knew to be the case in England.”).
111
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 302 (James Madison).
112
See id.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 302-03; see Manning, Ordinary Interpretation, supra note 24, at 2004 (noting too
that in The Federalist No. 47 Madison reads Montesquieu as prohibiting only exercise of the
entire power of one branch by another, not partial agency or absence of any controls over one
another).
116
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 303 (James Madison); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 7, at 308 (James Madison) (“It is agreed on all sides that the
powers properly belonging to one of the departments ought not to be directly and completely
administered by either of the other departments.”).
117
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James Madison). Indeed, Madison is
correcting against misreading two of Montesquieu’s most famous passages in precisely the
way that combination-of-functions objectors do, as described above. See supra text
accompanying notes 38-47. Madison writes that “[t]he reasons on which Montesquieu
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Madison then turns to showing that in the constitutions of the states, in no
instance are the powers of the several departments “absolutely separate and
distinct” despite the fact that the maxim of separation of powers is stated
“emphatically” and in some instances, “unequivocally.”118 After this
compilation of state practice, Madison concludes:
What I have wished to evince is that the charge brought against the
proposed Constitution of violating the sacred maxim of free government is
warranted neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its author,
nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in America.119
This clarification prevents reliance on the Madisonian prohibition as a ground
to object to agencies’ combination of functions. One could imagine the far-flung
scenario in which the entire power of one branch was vested in another—
suppose Congress enacted a statute that purposed to vest all judicial power in
administrative agencies (or in Congress!). Such an extreme arrangement would
violate the Madisonian prohibition properly understood. But no one claims that
the combination of functions in administrative agencies amounts to agencies
exercising the whole of the legislative or judicial power. Madison was at pains
to show that the mere combination of some legislative and some judicial power
in an executive office does not violate separation of powers.120 It is intriguing,
and a little worrisome, just how frequently the courts and commentators, for
decades, have latched on to snippets of The Federalist No. 47 in ways that
entirely neglect Madison’s essential point, which was to correct the broad
misreading of the maxims by his own contemporaries, misreadings
commentators and jurists—including members of the Supreme Court—
perpetuate.121
grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his meaning.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47,
supra note 7, at 303 (James Madison). He then cites Montesquieu’s statement, adding
emphasis: “When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person or
body . . . there can be no liberty because apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or
senate should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner.” Id. (quoting
MONTESQUIEU, supra note 47, at 173). Madison then quotes again: “Were the power of
judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to
arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive
power, the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.” Id. (quoting
MONTESQUIEU, supra, at 173); see also VILE, supra note 110, at 93-96.
118
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 304 (James Madison).
119
Id. at 308.
120
See id. at 302 (noting that departments could have partial agency in each other, and
some controls over each other).
121
See, e.g., Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018) (Thomas, J., plurality opinion)
(citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James Madison) for support in noting
that separated powers “prevents ‘[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
judiciary, in the same hands,’—an accumulation that would pose an inherent ‘threat to
liberty’” (citation omitted)); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998)
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Functional Failures

Even if there is no formal separation-of-powers prohibition on the
consolidation of functions in an agency, there might still be some functional
separation-of-powers argument against such accumulations.
The functional objection might be stated as follows: the three constitutionally
identified players are not actually wielding their constitutional authority;
instead, agencies are wielding an amalgamation of all three types of authority.
If such a broad power is exercised by administrative agencies, then having
separation at the constitutional level is no protection. The formalities have been
preserved, but in practice, agencies are wielding commingled government power
that the Constitution means to be kept separate.122 The premise of this argument
is that commingling in an agency poses similar risks to commingling at the
constitutional apex, or to the elimination of two branches of government, leaving
one to do all the work. This Section argues that premise is false; commingling
of functions within an agency does not pose the same dangers as the destruction
of separation at the constitutional level.
Why might the commingling of functions be problematic? Perhaps because
the unconstitutionality of agency combination of functions seems so self-evident
to those who object to it, there is remarkably little effort to explain what exactly
the functional problem is. Indeed, in general the benefits of separated powers are
taken as so self-evident that, other than knowing but undeveloped references to
tyranny and liberty, it is rare that the underlying justifications are fully worked
out. As John Manning has written, “to the extent one can discern the purposes
underlying . . . separation of powers, those purposes are vague, numerous,
unranked, and often self-contradictory.”123
Nonetheless, some recurrent themes are found in the writings of the framers
and later judges and commenters. Three justifications dominate: fairness,
protection against the triumph of faction or other wrong-headed or abusive
policies, and efficiency.124 We consider each in turn.
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James
Madison) for “axiom” that “[s]eparation of powers was designed to implement a fundamental
insight: Concentration of power in the hands of a single branch is a threat to liberty”).
122
See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
446-47 (1987) (“There is little competition among different administrative functionaries
within agencies, with ‘ambition’ operating to ‘check ambition.’ More often, the administrators
are expected and believed to act in concert; indeed, that expectation was one of the reasons
for the creation of the agency.”).
123
John F. Manning, The Means of Constitutional Power, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1, 55 (2014);
see also M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation of Powers Law, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1127, 1156, 1183-84 (2000) (“Other than declaring that the accumulation of functions
is the ‘very definition of tyranny,’ courts and commentators rarely specify why governmental
functions must be parceled out to separate institutions.” (footnote omitted) (quoting THE
FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra note 7, at 301 (James Madison))).
124
In this discussion, we focus on separation of powers in particular, not the
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1. Fairness
Separation-of-powers arguments frequently rest on concerns about fairness.
Most obviously, for example, the prosecutor should not also be the judge. This
principle is absolutely applicable to agency operations and often merits, and
receives, a structural response. The APA’s separation of functions provisions
directly address this concern.125 In the present day, not everyone considers ALJs’
guarantees of independence sufficient; private litigants do not trust them and
think the proceeding is rigged in the agencies’ favor.126 Separation of powers
may be invoked in these arguments, but the fundamental issue is not the
separation-of-powers abstraction but the tangible, intuitive concern over
fairness.127 As we discuss below in Section III.C, this concern is best evaluated
as a due process, not as freestanding separation-of-powers, issue.128
2.

Faction

The triumph of faction that so preoccupied the framers, or at least James
Madison,129 also does not require division of agency functions.
Consider the risk that an agency might come to represent or be unduly
responsive to a particular faction. Decades of debate over agency capture
suggests that factional sway is a serious concern at the agency level.130 Because
the relevant interests are narrower, interest groups may be better defined, less
diffuse, more focused, and more motivated than at the overall political level.
Indeed, much of the consternation regarding deregulation by the Trump
administration rests on the understanding that the agencies (and the White

complementary but distinct principle of checks and balances. We do not dispute the value—
indeed, necessity—of intra-governmental checks to avoid abuse, but one can have checks
without separating functions. We consider the functional arguments sounding in checks and
balances in Section III.C.
125
See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d)(2).
126
See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text; see also Editorial, Trump Is Politicizing
the Federal Government Even Further. Step in, Congress., WASH. POST (July 22, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-is-politicizing-the-federal-governmenteven-further-step-in-congress/2018/07/22/eb4ce8ee-8ac1-11e8-8aea86e88ae760d8_story.html.
127
See, e.g., Michael B. Rappaport, Replacing Agency Adjudication with Independent
Administrative Courts, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 811, 815 (2019) (noting, in the context of
objections to the affront agencies pose to separation of powers, “serious causes for concern
about the ALJ’s impartiality”).
128
See infra Section III.C.2.
129
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 7, at 77 (James Madison).
130
See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Concept of Regulatory Capture: A Short, Inglorious
History, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO
LIMIT IT 49, 54 (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2013).
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House) are in the pockets of particular industries,131 and those concerns resonate
with many decades of concern over agency capture.132 If separation of powers is
a cure for capture, then arguably it is especially important for agencies.
But that is a big “if.” It is not clear that separating functions is or would be an
effective remedy to agency capture. A three-branch EPA, or three EPAs (one for
writing regulations, one for adjudicating, one for enforcement), would have
three heads all appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the president. They
would all have exactly the same likelihood or extent of capture by specific
interests; they could be fired if they failed to be responsive to those interests. All
the motivations and mechanisms through which interest groups might capture
commingled agencies would be equally potent with regard to distinct,
noncommingled agency entities. Moreover, the determinants of capture are
multiple and complex, including the scope and nature of the agency’s mission,
the extent of White House oversight and involvement, the relationship to
Congress and congressional committees, the particular interests within the
agency’s jurisdiction, and others. Commingling functions seems a very small
and easily overwhelmed aspect of the capture problem.
Nor does separation of powers offer a remedy to the problem, voiced in some
quarters, that tyranny results from too much government and not enough
market.133 It is undeniable that the modern federal regulatory regime is vast, that
it sometimes goes too far, and that it would not be possible without
administrative agencies. Thus, one standard argument for an enhanced
nondelegation doctrine is that such a doctrine would result in less law, period;
for some delegation opponents, the problem is that Supreme Court’s refusal to
police delegations has facilitated an amount of regulation that would be

131
See, e.g., David Roberts, Donald Trump Is Handing the Federal Government Over to
Fossil Fuel Interests, VOX (June 14, 2017, 7:56 AM), https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2017/6/13/15681498/trump-government-fossil-fuels [https://perma.cc/W58ZVME3]; Rachel Wilson, Oil, Gas, and Coal Interests Filling Donald Trump’s “Swamp” with
Cash, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (May 2, 2017), https://publicintegrity.org/politics/oil-gasand-coal-interests-filling-donald-trumps-swamp-with-cash/ [https://perma.cc/4JYN-XFD7]
(noting heavy inauguration donations and lobbying activities by particular industries that were
(in turn, it is implied) benefiting from regulatory rollbacks).
132
See generally Sheldon Whitehouse, How Government Can Root Out Agency Capture,
REGUL. REV. (June 15, 2016), https://www.theregreview.org/2016/06/15/whitehouse-howgovernment-can-root-out-regulatory-capture/ [https://perma.cc/GGR7-DEWX]; Thomas W.
Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039 (1997)
(providing an overview of ebb and flow of the conviction that regulators are in the pocket of
the regulated).
133
See, e.g., J. Kennerly Davis, Regulating Under the Rule of Law, 19 FEDERALIST SOC’Y
REV. 162, 171 (2018) (reviewing THOMAS A. LAMBERT, HOW TO REGULATE: A GUIDE FOR
POLICYMAKERS (2017)) (lamenting the “consolidation of once separate government
functions” as an aspect of a regulatory regime that is essentially “arbitrary”).
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impossible if Congress had to make all rules itself.134 But that it is not a
separation-of-powers problem; it is a delegation problem. The same overregulation concern would arise if Congress created a “junior-varsity Congress,”
empowered only to write regulations and not to enforce them or adjudicate their
violation.135 Surely, for example, no OSHA critic breathes sighs of relief that the
agency is less tyrannical, and regulates less than it otherwise would, because it
lacks the adjudicatory powers most agencies have and so is less of an offense to
separation-of-powers principles.136
3. Efficiency
Separation of powers also has been justified on the quite distinct ground of
efficiency. This seems counterintuitive given the familiar story that the framers
sought to err on the side of inefficiency and stalemate so as to preserve liberty.
But separation of powers is also a synonym for “division of labor,” the essential
goal of which is that jobs are done efficiently and effectively by people who
know what they are doing and have a comparative advantage over other actors
in doing them.137
Efficiency lacks the rhetorical power of appeals to liberty and against tyranny,
so Supreme Court justices tend to ignore or reject it. Many oft-quoted and
reverberant statements from the Supreme Court directly deny that separation of
powers has anything to do with efficiency.138 Nonetheless, the case for separated

134

See, e.g., Environmental Regulations, the Economy, and Jobs: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Env’t and the Econ. of the H. Comm. on Energy and Com., 112th Cong. 44
(2011) (statement of Christopher DeMuth, American Enterprise Institute) (“The size, scope,
reticulation, and minuteness of the modern ‘nanny state’ is an artifact of regulatory delegation:
it could not have been achieved and it could not be managed through direct legislation.”).
135
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 427 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing
that U.S. Sentencing Commission is unconstitutional precisely because it exercises only a
legislative function and Constitution prohibits creation of such a “junior-varsity Congress”).
136
See George Robert Johnson, The Split-Enforcement Model: Some Conclusions from the
OSHA and MSHA Experiences, 39 ADMIN. L. REV. 315, 315 (1987).
137
See generally Louis Fisher, The Efficiency Side of Separated Powers, 5 J. AM. STUD.
113 (1971) (asserting that framers’ goals included efficiency and that they sought to realize
that goal with separate executive).
138
Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Myers sets the tone: “The doctrine of the separation of
powers was adopted by the convention of 1787, not to promote efficiency but to preclude the
exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but, by means of the
inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers among three
departments, to save the people from autocracy.” Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293
(1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
579, 613-14 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (quoting id.). That sentiment is often echoed.
See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1982) (“[T]he fact that a given law or procedure
is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone,
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic government . . . .”); United States v.
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powers also sounds in efficiency.139 And now and again the Court acknowledges
that there is something to this idea.140
Efficiency is in some tension with the other two goals. The Constitution’s
method for avoiding tyranny and the triumph of faction is to render lawmaking
and enforcement inefficient.141 But efficiency is relevant in three ways. First, as
Aziz Huq and Jon Michaels point out, it does not necessarily conflict with the
goals of avoiding tyranny and advancing liberty.142 To the extent government
acts to advance liberty, we should want it to do so efficiently. Second,
inefficiency may be a value, but one can have too much of a good thing. The
idea is to have the right amount.143 Third, the goal of division of labor is not just
speed but the quality that flows from specialization.144
So in inquiring whether agencies’ combination of functions is problematic
given the goals of separating powers, part of the inquiry is whether the
combination is efficient. The traditional and still generally accepted answer is
that it is. Indeed, the idea that agencies’ work is enhanced by housing all three
sorts of powers under one roof is one of the founding tenets of the modern

Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 443 (1965) (“This ‘separation of powers’ was obviously not instituted
with the idea that it would promote governmental efficiency. It was, on the contrary, looked
to as a bulwark against tyranny.”); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 863 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that value of judicial independence should
not be traded off against concerns with efficiency).
139
See William C. Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation of Powers Reconsidered,
35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 715, 717 (1984); N.W. Barber, Prelude to the Separation of Powers, 60
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 5, 65 (2001) (“[I]t is efficiency, not liberty, which is at the heart of the
separation of powers.”); Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers
Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 383-85 (2016) (describing Supreme Court’s inconsistent
reliance on “effective administration” as justification for separation of powers); Leslie M.
Kelleher, Separation of Powers and Delegations of Authority to Cancel Statutes in the Line
Item Veto Act and the Rules Enabling Act, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 395, 408 (2000); Arthur
Selwyn Miller, An Inquiry into the Relevance of the Intentions of the Founding Fathers, with
Special Emphasis upon the Doctrine of Separation of Powers, 27 ARK. L. REV. 583, 587
(1973) (“Powers were separated in 1787 as much to promote efficiency as anything else.”);
Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: Legal Accountability and the
Separation of Powers, 11 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 393 (1993) (“[T]he Constitution divides
governmental powers both to permit the checking and balancing of each branch by the others,
and also to insure that the mission assigned to each branch is most likely to be implemented
effectively.”); Jonathan Zasloff, Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California’s
Separation of Powers, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1079, 1125 (2004) (“To be sure, the separation of
powers does not only serve to filter majority sentiment. Hamilton and Madison argued that it
enhanced governmental efficiency.” (footnote omitted)).
140
See, e.g., Schor, 478 U.S. at 841.
141
See Myers, 272 U.S. at 292-93.
142
See Huq & Michaels, supra note 139, at 351.
143
Cf. Vermeule, Optimal Abuse, supra note 82, at 676.
144
See Kelleher, supra note 139, at 408.
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administrative state.145 For example, an agency that can both write regulations
and adjudicate regulatory and statutory violations can choose the optimal policymaking form;146 one or the other may be preferable depending on the
circumstances.147 Similarly, enforcement may be more effective and appropriate
when carried out by those with expertise in the meaning and purpose of the
regulations being enforced. And the combination of functions will promote
consistency and coordination. A full, empirical assessment of these putative
benefits is well beyond the scope of this project; but they are legitimate
considerations.
In short, in the agency setting, separation of powers would be inefficient, and
it is the combination of powers that promotes efficiency. The efficiency from
specialization is achieved instead by a jurisdictional separation of subject matter.
4.

Summary

The foregoing suggests that no functional separation-of-powers argument
requires separation of functions with the agency. Concerns about fairness can be
addressed by due process. Separation at the functional level in the agency does
not address concerns about agency capture, and the efficiency value may
actually be better achieved by commingling of functions. Functional concerns
offer no more justification for the anti-accumulation principle than do formal
arguments.
III. THE ANTI-ACCUMULATION PRINCIPLE AT THE MARGINS
The previous Part argued that there is no constitutional foundation for the antiaccumulation principle as applied to the overall structure of executive
departments and agencies. Here we turn to instances in which the same principle
is invoked to challenge not the basic structure but the allocation of specific
responsibilities. A number of current controversies regarding agency power are
debated at least in part in separation-of-powers terms, with skeptics arguing that
this or that judicial doctrine is invalid because it makes an agency wear two hats.
That is, these doctrinal debates all involve a choice between one approach that
accentuates, or increases the degree of, the commingling versus an approach that
minimizes the commingling.
Before turning to these specific doctrines, it is worth emphasizing one general
point. If one accepts the constitutionality of the combination of agency functions
145

See, e.g., LANDIS, supra note 52, at 10-11 (“If in private life we were to organize a unit
for the operation of an industry, it would scarcely follow Montesquieu’s lines.”); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.5 (3d ed. 1991).
146
The point in this paragraph is developed in Vermeule, Optimal Abuse, supra note 82,
at 691-92.
147
SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947). See generally M.
Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383 (2004)
(noting that agencies can use array of policy-making tools that may be similar to legislating,
enforcing, and adjudicating).
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as a general matter, as we have argued, then invoking the anti-accumulation
principle at the margins—that is, arguing that this or that specific activity or
authority is invalid because it combines different powers or increases
consolidation as compared to a chance baseline—is a nonstarter. These more
specific instances are a fortiori given the general principle. In the discussion that
follows, we do not repeat that there is no stand-alone separation-of-powers
requirement that prohibits individual instances any more than there is such a
requirement that prohibits overall structure. But that is still the case.
This is not to say that the particular doctrines discussed here are beyond
question. Some raise difficult issues. But they are not separation-of-powers
issues—they are due process issues. As we shall see, even those who purport to
rely on separation-of-powers principles are in fact most concerned about
fairness.
A.

Deference Doctrines

The starkest example of invoking separation of powers to challenge an
administrative law doctrine involves the deference doctrine articulated in Auer
v. Robbins148 and Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co.149 Auer requires that a
reviewing court give “controlling” weight to an agency’s interpretation of its
own regulation unless that interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent
with the regulation.”150
In an important article, John Manning challenged Seminole Rock on the
ground that it contradicts the fundamental “constitutional premise that
lawmaking and law-exposition must be distinct.”151 Justice Scalia agreed,
invoking Montesquieu when writing in a concurring opinion that it “seems
contrary to fundamental principles of separation of powers to permit the person
who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.”152 A few years later, Justice Scalia
expressed the point more forcefully, arguing that Auer violates a “fundamental
principle of separation of powers,” namely that “the power to write a law and
the power to interpret it cannot rest in the same hands,”153 again with support
from the same passage from Montesquieu.

148

519 U.S. 452, 461-62 (1997).
325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
150
Auer, 519 U.S. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S.
332, 359 (1989)).
151
See Manning, Constitutional Structure, supra note 18, at 654.
152
Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(“When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same
body of magistrates, there can be no liberty; because apprehensions may arise, lest the same
monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a tyrannical manner.”
(quoting MONTESQUIEU, supra note 47, at 151-52)).
153
Decker v. Nw. Env’t Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 619 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting MONTESQUIEU, supra note 47, at 151-52).
149
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Before and since Justice Scalia’s death, Justice Thomas has endorsed versions
of the same argument.154 More recently Justice Gorsuch has pressed it with
particular force. In Kisor v. Wilkie,155 the Supreme Court upheld Auer by a vote
of five to four, with the Chief Justice joining the four more liberal Justices to
form a majority.156 However, there were five votes only for the judgment and
portions of Justice Kagan’s opinion that set out: (a) limitations on Auer’s
application; and (b) the stare decisis justifications for not overruling it.157 Justice
Kagan’s actual defense of Auer on the merits and rejection of the separation-ofpowers objection attracted the votes of only three other Justices.158 Justice
Gorsuch, writing in concurrence for himself and three others, embraced the view
that Auer “sits uneasily with the Constitution.”159 After recounting the distinct
roles of each branch in our system of separated powers, Justice Gorsuch wrote:
“Auer thus means that, far from being ‘kept distinct,’ the powers of making,
enforcing, and interpreting laws are united in the same hands—and in the
process a cornerstone of the rule of law is compromised.”160
As an invocation of separation-of-powers law, this makes no sense for the
reasons given above. But it is not even clear that for Justice Gorsuch separation
of powers is the heart of the matter. Rather, the core concern seems to be
adjudicatory fairness. Justice Gorsuch views Auer as requiring judges to
interpret laws “to mean not what [the judge] thinks they mean, but what an
executive agency says they mean.”161 That is a problem because executive
officials, Justice Gorsuch explains, are not, and are not supposed to be, “wholly
impartial.”162 As a result of the Auer doctrine, Justice Gorsuch strongly suggests,
the individual is deprived of a fundamental aspect of a fair proceeding—an

154
See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 126 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment) (challenging Auer because it results in “accumulation of government
powers”); Garco Constr., Inc. v. Speer, 138 S. Ct. 1052, 1053-54 (2018) (Thomas, J., joined
by Gorsuch, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari) (same).
155
139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019).
156
Id. at 2405-06.
157
Justice Kagan delivered an opinion for the Court only with regard to Parts I (factual
and procedural background), II-B (limitations of Auer), III-B (stare decisis), and IV
(conclusions as applied). Id. at 2405.
158
See id. at 2421 (rejecting this challenge). For a general account, emphasizing the
closeness of the outcome, see Michael Herz, Symposium: In “Gundy II,” Auer Survives by a
Vote of 4.6 to 4.4, SCOTUSBLOG (June 27, 2019, 11:30 AM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2019/06/symposium-in-gundy-ii-auer-survives-by-a-vote-of-46-to-4-4/ [https://perma.cc/3JZC-YKK4].
159
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2437 (Gorsuch, J., concurring, joined by Thomas, Alito, and
Kavanaugh, JJ.).
160
Id. at 2439.
161
Id.
162
Id. (citing Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60
HARV. L. REV. 370, 390 (1947)).
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impartial adjudicator.163 A due process concern is thus at the heart of the
formalist internal separation-of-powers objection to Auer.
The same is true of challenges to the Chevron doctrine. Chevron, as is familiar
to all students of administrative law, requires courts to accept any reasonable
agency interpretation of an ambiguous statute the agency administers.164 Justice
(then-Judge) Gorsuch’s concurring opinion in Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch165
argues that Chevron violates the prohibition on delegation of legislative
power,166 is an “abdication of the judicial duty,”167 and violates a freestanding
separation-of-powers principle.168 As Justice Gorsuch sees it, “[u]nder
[Chevron’s] terms, an administrative agency may set and revise policy
(legislative), override adverse judicial determinations (judicial), and exercise
enforcement discretion (executive).”169 He frames this problem in terms of
separation of powers: while “[n]one of this is to suggest that Chevron is ‘the
very definition of tyranny,’” it is “an arrangement . . . that seems pretty hard to
square with the Constitution of the founders’ design.”170 Again, if the problem
is the commingling of functions, there is no formal or functional constitutional
prohibition on that arrangement.
Justice Gorsuch’s actual objection to Chevron, like the objections to Auer,
sounds in due process. Justice Gorsuch makes the due process concern explicit:
“Transferring the job of saying what the law is from the judiciary to the
executive,” which is what he understands Chevron to do, “unsurprisingly invites
the very sort of due process (fair notice) and equal protection concerns the
framers knew would arise if the political branches intruded on judicial
functions.”171 For Justice Gorsuch, what Chevron threatens is notice of the law.
Under Chevron, he writes, the public is not charged with awareness of the “the
fairest reading of the law that a detached magistrate can muster” but with
awareness of whether the statute would be deemed ambiguous and the agency’s
interpretation reasonable.172 The problem with deference, then, is that it
undercuts the principle that those who may be penalized for failure to comply
with a law must have notice of what the law requires. Justice Gorsuch also
identifies a related retroactivity concern with Chevron. Under Chevron, the
individual must also be alert to the prospect that the agency will adopt new

163

Id.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
165
834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
166
Id. at 1154-55 (“But even taking the forgiving intelligible principle test as a given, it’s
no small question whether Chevron can clear it.”).
167
Id. at 1152.
168
Id. at 1154.
169
Id. at 1155.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 1152.
172
Id.
164
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interpretations “only retroactively in administrative adjudications.”173
Chevron’s structural failure, on this view, is the due process problem of failure
to give adequate notice of the law.
For Justice Gorsuch, the due process problems of Chevron run deeper still,
including undermining the fairness of proceedings before the agency. He argues
that the rationale for withholding Chevron deference in criminal matters174 also
applies to civil matters. If the court will not defer to the prosecutor’s
interpretation of a criminal statute because doing so would be unfair to the
defendant, the fairness concern also applies in civil matters where the
consequences for individuals can also be grave.175
B.

Agency Powers

The anti-accumulation principle has also been invoked by commentators to
challenge specific agency powers. For illustrative purposes, we focus on two of
those challenges: agency adjudication and the Attorney General’s “refer-andreview” authority in immigration matters.
Recent years have seen extensive litigation over the appointment,
removability, and use of ALJs, particularly by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”).176 In Lucia v. SEC,177 the Supreme Court held that SEC
ALJs are officers of the United States and therefore can only be appointed in
accordance with the Appointments Clause.178 Alongside this litigation,
commentators have argued that granting an agency adjudicative power violates

173

Id.
Abramski v. United States, 573 U.S. 169, 191 (2014) (“[C]riminal laws are for courts,
not for the Government, to construe.”). But see Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Federal
Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. REV. 469 (1996) (arguing in favor of applying Chevron in the
criminal setting).
175
Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1156 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“And try as I might, I
have a hard time identifying a principled reason why the same rationale doesn’t also apply to
statutes with purely civil application.”). Philip Hamburger presses this point as well. In
applying Chevron, as Hamburger sees it, judges “exercise systematically biased judgment,”
which violates not only their basic duties as judicial officers but also the Fifth Amendment’s
guarantee of due process. Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187,
1211 (2016).
176
See, e.g., Ilan Wurman, Constitutional Administration, 69 STAN. L. REV. 359, 372
(2017) (referring to the SEC as “perhaps the worst offender” among federal agencies that
enforce their own rules in adjudications before their own judges, who obligingly always rule
in favor of the agency).
177
138 S. Ct. 2044 (2018).
178
Id. at 2053. In a straightforward opinion by Justice Kagan, the Court ruled that ALJs
were doing essentially the same sort of work, with the same sort of supervision and authority,
as the special trial judges on the U.S. Tax Court that were held to be inferior officers in
Freytag v. United States, 501 U.S. 868 (1991). Id. at 2053-56. Justice Breyer would have
reached the same result on statutory grounds. Id. at 2057 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice
Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented, arguing that ALJs are mere employees. Id.
at 2066 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
174
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separation of powers.179 In this vein, Richard Epstein criticizes the “cozy
arrangement” under which the SEC “promulgates extensive regulations that
have the force of law, which it then enforces against individual defendants, often
in an SEC tribunal.”180 While Epstein describes the problem as one of separation
of powers,181 his actual concern throughout is with fairness.182 His title
complains of a “miscarriage of justice.” He wants litigants to have “the
procedural protection given by an Article III court” and insists that “major
enforcement actions intended to curtail the liberties of the ordinary people of the
United States” be adjudicated by an Article III court (though social security and
immigration cases need not be—a distinction that reflects pure due-process
balancing rather than any distinction sounding in the nature of the power
exercised).183 And he decries—the greatest outrage—the SEC’s handpicking the
ALJ for a particular matter rather than relying on random assignment.184
To take a second example, the Attorney General’s authority over immigration
decisions has also prompted challenges invoking separation of powers. Outside
of the Social Security Administration (“SSA”), the nation’s largest regime of
administrative adjudication and mass justice are the immigration courts. There
are sixty-six such courts, staffed by 535 judges, located around the country.185
Immigration Judges (“IJs”) are not ALJs; they are Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) attorneys appointed by the Attorney General and “subject to such
supervision and [required to] perform such duties as the Attorney General shall
prescribe.”186 Immigration Judges hold hearings and make the initial

179
Oliver J. Dunford, SEC ALJs and the Accumulation of Power, DAILY J. (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.dailyjournal.com/articles/345761-sec-aljs-and-the-accumulation-of-power
[https://perma.cc/WVL2-XRFC] (arguing that the appointments clause problem arises
precisely because “Congress has granted to these executive agents vast legislative and judicial
authority without requiring their appointment through the appointments clause”).
180
Richard A. Epstein, Miscarriage of Justice at the SEC, DEFINING IDEAS (Apr. 30, 2018),
https://www.hoover.org/research/miscarriage-justice-sec [https://perma.cc/2S6V-WCJA].
181
See id. (“Even if the ALJ had been appointed by the SEC, separation of powers is
heavily compromised if any executive branch official can appoint a judicial officer to decide
cases that are brought by its own enforcement division . . . .”).
182
See id. (noting that whether the SEC’s procedures “satisfy the Fifth Amendment” is a
“hard question,” since “[t]he words ‘due process’ are supposed to offer strong protections
against even the appearance of bias”).
183
See id.; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 347-48 (1976) (establishing
balancing test to determine what process is due when the government deprives a person of
life, liberty, or property).
184
Epstein, supra note 180.
185
Office of the Chief Immigration Judge, U.S. DOJ (Aug. 2, 2021),
https://www.justice.gov/eoir/office-of-the-chief-immigration-judge [https://perma.cc/K4JX6MUU].
186
8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(4).
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determination whether individuals are deportable and, if so, whether they can
and should receive discretionary relief from removal.187
Although judicial review of IJ decisions is limited,188 DOJ regulations have
created two layers of internal agency review. First, either side can appeal to the
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), a twenty-one-member body whose
members are also appointed by the Attorney General.189 In addition, the
Attorney General can refer any BIA decision to herself sua sponte.190 Attorneys
General have exercised this “certification” or “refer-and-review” power with
varying frequency over the years. The practice was common during the second
Bush administration, and the then-Attorney General, Alberto Gonzales, has
celebrated refer-and-review “as a powerful tool through which the executive
branch can assert its prerogatives in the immigration field.”191 Jeff Sessions, too,
was enthusiastic.192 Perhaps the most prominent instance during Sessions’s time
in office was his much-publicized ruling in A-B-,193 which overruled a 2014 BIA
precedent that had recognized domestic violence as a ground for asylum.194
Sessions’s ruling was later set aside by the D.C. Circuit.195
Among others, Stephen Legomsky assails refer-and-review, viewing it as one
part of a suite of DOJ structures that compromise the decisional independence

187
A helpful overview of the process is Catherine Y. Kim, The President’s Immigration
Courts, 68 EMORY L.J. 1, 21-22 (2018).
188
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2).
189
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (2021) (establishing BIA); Id. § 1003.3(a)(1) (allowing either
party to appeal adverse decisions to the BIA).
190
Id. § 1003.1(h)(1)(i).
191
Alberto R. Gonzales & Patrick Glen, Advancing Executive Branch Immigration Policy
Through the Attorney General’s Review Authority, 101 IOWA L. REV. 841, 841 (2016).
192
Dara Lind, Jeff Sessions Is Exerting Unprecedented Control over Immigration
Courts—by Ruling on Cases Himself, VOX (May 21, 2018, 1:06 PM),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/5/14/17311314/immigration-jeff-sessionscourt-judge-ruling [https://perma.cc/T2Y7-EFPG]. Attorney General Sessions’s interventions
were generally in the direction of making removal more likely. See, e.g., S-O-G- & F-D-B-,
27 I. & N. Dec. 462, 463 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (restricting the authority of immigration judges
to terminate or dismiss removal proceedings); L-A-B-R-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405, 419 (Att’y
Gen. 2018) (restricting immigration court discretion to grant continuances of removal
proceedings); Castro-Tum, 27 I. & N. Dec. 271, 272 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (rejecting the practice
of administrative closure of removal proceedings in the immigration courts and instructing
immigration courts to expeditiously decide cases); E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226, 226 (Att’y
Gen. 2018) (directing BIA to refer matter to Attorney General and vacating IJ decision).
193
27 I. & N. Dec. 316 (Att’y Gen. 2018) (narrowing criteria for the membership in a
“particular social group” required for asylum seekers fleeing private violence).
194
Id. at 317. See generally Recent Adjudication—Asylum Law—Attorney General’s
Certification Power—Attorney General Holds that Salvadoran Woman Fleeing Domestic
Violence Failed to Establish a Cognizable Particular Social Group, 132 HARV. L. REV. 803
(2018).
195
Grace v. Barr, 965 F.3d 883, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2020).
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of immigration judges.196 Much of his separation-of-powers discussion is
focused on and relevant to the Article III judiciary and its role in checking the
other branches.197 But he also offers a somewhat Lawsonian objection to referand-review and other aspects of the Attorney General’s influence over
adjudicators. “[T]he direct threat is to decisional independence, with all its
implications for fair process. In addition, however, the same people who perform
the law-enforcement functions—arresting, detaining, and prosecuting—also
influence the outcome of the adjudication, thereby neutralizing the checks and
balances that separation-of-powers principles are meant to protect.”198 While
acknowledging that due process concerns are “directly” implicated by the
Attorney General’s review authority, Legomsky offers separation of powers as
a distinct interest that is also threatened.199
Legomsky may be correct that refer-and-review should be abandoned. The
Attorney General may be the wrong person (or DOJ the wrong agency) to make
these decisions, the use of individual adjudications as vehicles for broader policy
decisions has well-known risks, and sua sponte self-referrals may be unfair. But
because there is no constitutional principle of anti-accumulation, these are policy
arguments, not constitutional ones.
C.

Why Due Process Does Not Matter—and Why It Does

The invocation of due process concerns in the midst of anti-accumulation
arguments suggests that flagging a threat to individual fairness strengthens the
argument that there has been a separation-of-powers violation. Do these
arguments make sense?
1.

Combinative Constitutional Argument

The Supreme Court generally considers constitutional clauses in isolation.200
A given statute or action might violate this provision or that one, but the different
constitutional challenges are considered in turn. Sometimes, however, the Court
196
See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J.
1635, 1671-75 (2010) [hereinafter Legomsky, Restructuring]; see also Stephen H. Legomsky,
Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 369, 388 (2006) [hereinafter
Legomsky, Deportation].
197
Legomsky, Restructuring, supra note 196, at 1686-88.
198
Legomsky, Deportation, supra note 196, at 387.
199
See Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should Establish an Article
I Immigration Court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 3, 3-4 (2008). The author, who was then
president of the National Association of Immigration Judges, objects to the conflict of interest
and violation of checks and balances resulting from having the Attorney General, the nation’s
chief prosecutor, also “act[] as the boss of the judges who decide whether an accused noncitizen should be removed from the United States” and also supervise the Office of
Immigration Litigation, which represents the government in immigration cases in the courts
of appeals. Id.
200
Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 106970 (2016).
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combines constitutional clauses to reach a conclusion of invalidity that would
not have been supportable under each clause on its own.201 This approach can
take different forms: relying on two different rights to find a violation,
combining a weak argument that the government lacks authority to act with a
stronger argument that the action infringes a right, or aggregating government
powers to validate an action.202 In these cases, as Michael Coenen writes, the
Court has “combine[d] the clauses by adding up or summing together separate
conclusions of partial clausal consistency (or inconsistency) to produce an
overall conclusion of total constitutionality (or unconstitutionality).”203 In other
words, each constitutional clause or argument on its own may not be sufficient
for invalidity (or validity), but their cumulative effect establishes a violation (or
authorization).
In this manner, might due process (i.e., fairness) concerns bolster the
separation-of-powers objection to the combination of functions in agencies
sufficiently to turn the color of constitutional litmus paper?204 They do not. As a
practical matter, in cases in which due process is claimed to augment a
separation-of-powers challenge, litigants face no obstacles to bringing a due
process claim. Litigants in agency adjudications frequently seek review of the
adjudicative determination, including on the ground that the adjudication
violated due process.205 Those challenges include claims that the agency
adjudicator was not sufficiently impartial.206 Perhaps due process doctrine
underprotects procedural rights and rights to notice. Perhaps not. But if the
fundamental objection is to the protections afforded by due process doctrine,
then the remedy lies in reconstructing due process doctrine.
Moreover, where the Court has used multiple clauses in combination, each
clause contributes something distinct to the argument for a constitutional
violation (or authorization). But there is no separation of powers clause. If, as
argued in previous Parts, there is no freestanding separation-of-powers principle
that prohibits combination of some functions within the executive branch, then
the idea of combination here is merely a distraction. A constitutional argument
without foundation when combined with due process concerns amounts only to

201

Id. at 1075-76.
See id. at 1077-91.
203
Id. at 1092.
204
Cf. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 629 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(doubting whether “enough can be squeezed from these poor and puny anonymities to turn
the color of legal litmus paper”).
205
See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 (1993); Bank of La. v. Fed. Deposit Ins.
Corp., 919 F.3d 916, 921 (5th Cir. 2019); Cal. Pac. Bank v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 885 F.3d
560, 572-73 (9th Cir. 2018); Reddy v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 191 F.3d 109,
124 (2d Cir. 1999).
206
See, e.g., Keith v. Barnhart, 473 F.3d 782, 783 (7th Cir. 2007); Islam v. Gonzales, 469
F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2006); Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 595 (3d Cir. 2003).
202
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those due process concerns—zero plus due process equals due process. The
remedy is with due process, not separation of powers.207
2. The Combination of Functions and Due Process
The point of the foregoing is not that the combination of functions in
administrative agencies raises no due process concerns. It certainly does. Rather,
our position is that those concerns should be assessed for what they are. We
would abandon imaginary concerns over separation of powers and focus on the
real question, which is whether and when the concentration of authority within
an agency creates an unacceptable threat to impartial decision-making.208
It is wholly appropriate, then, that while (until the recent rumblings) the
Supreme Court has shown no concern about the combination of functions as a
separation-of-powers problem, it has taken due process objections seriously. To
be sure, it has consistently held that there is no per se due process violation when
a single individual has both investigatory or prosecutorial and adjudicatory
functions.209 However, it has acknowledged that in particular circumstances
207
Rebecca Brown has argued forcefully that the best account of separation of powers
incorporates considerations of individual liberties. See Brown, supra note 47, at 1516 (arguing
that “when government action is challenged on separation-of-powers grounds, the Court
should consider the potential effect of the arrangement on individual due-process interests”).
For Brown, separation-of-powers claims are best viewed as a species of due process
violations; accordingly, ostensible separation-of-powers violations can be cured by the
presence of due process protections. Id. at 1516-17. We are unconvinced that the two issues
interact in the way Brown suggests, at least with regard to the executive branch, though we
agree that the central concern here is due process.
208
In this, we agree with Justice Marshall. Concurring in Touby v. United States, the 1991
decision rejecting outright separation-of-powers challenges to the combination of functions,
see supra note 24, Justice Marshall wrote:
I wish to emphasize . . . my understanding of the breadth of the Court’s constitutional
holding. I agree that the separation of powers doctrine relates only to the allocation of
power between the Branches, not the allocation of power within a single Branch. But this
conclusion by no means suggests that the Constitution as a whole is indifferent to how
permissibly delegated powers are distributed within the Executive Branch. In particular,
the Due Process Clause limits the extent to which prosecutorial and other functions may
be combined in a single actor. Petitioners raise no due process challenge in this case, and
I do not understand anything in today’s decision as detracting from the teachings of our
due process jurisprudence generally.
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 170-71 (1991) (Marshall, J., joined by Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (citation omitted).
209
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 52, 55 (1975) (upholding the combination of
investigatory and adjudicative functions in a state medical licensing board); Marcello v.
Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955) (rejecting contention that special inquiry officer being
subject to supervision of agency officials “charged with investigative and prosecuting
functions . . . strips the hearing of fairness and impartiality”); Hortonville Joint Sch. Dist. v.
Hortonville Educ. Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482, 493 (1976) (rejecting claim “that the Board was biased
because it negotiated with the teachers on behalf of the school district without reaching
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exposure to facts uncovered in an investigation might preclude fair and effective
consideration at a subsequent adversary hearing and so deny due process.210
More recently, in a non-agency context, the Court held that a judge could not
hear a case on which he had previously worked as a district attorney.211 Relying
on the criminal case of In re Murchison212 and the general principle that “no man
agreement and learned about the reasons for the strike in the course of negotiating”);
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (rejecting challenge to hearing examiner
developing facts on behalf of the agency). Kristin Hickman and Richard Pierce summarize:
“The Supreme Court has never held a system of combined functions to be a violation of due
process, and it has upheld several such systems.” KRISTIN E. HICKMAN & RICHARD J. PIERCE,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 7.8 (6th ed., 2022-1 cumulative supplement 2021). The
lower courts have also consistently rejected such claims. See, e.g., Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc.
v. Covidien LP, 812 F.3d 1023, 1029-31 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (rejecting due process challenge to
having same panel of administrative judges institute and then decide review of patent
validity); Moore v. Bd. of Educ. of Johnson City Schs., 134 F.3d 781, 786 (6th Cir. 1998)
(upholding arrangement under which school superintendent is both the investigator and the
official responsible for rendering an opinion leading to a teacher’s termination); Greenberg v.
Bd. of Governors of Fed. Rsrv. Sys., 968 F.2d 164, 167 (2d Cir. 1992); Simpson v. Off. of
Thrift Supervision, 29 F.3d 1418, 1424 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding no due process violation when
person who commenced the proceeding subsequently judged it); Sheldon v. SEC, 45 F.3d
1515, 1518 (11th Cir. 1995); Beard v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 801 F.2d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Frank’s Livestock & Poultry Farm, Inc. v. United States, 905 F.2d 1515, 1518 (Fed.
Cir. 1990); Marine Shale Processors, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 81 F.3d 1371, 1385 (5th Cir. 1996);
Elliott v. SEC, 36 F.3d 86, 87 (11th Cir. 1994); FTC v. Cinderella Career & Finishing Schs.,
404 F.2d 1308, 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (“Congress has . . . vested administrative agencies with
both the . . . power to act in an accusatory capacity . . . and with the responsibility of
ultimately determining the merits of the charges . . . .”). See generally Michael Asimow,
When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal Administrative Agencies, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 759, 782-84 (1981) (describing character of combination of functions in
administrative agencies).
210
Withrow, 421 U.S. at 52 (declining to adopt any rigid rule for combined functions in
adjudications, the acceptability of which will turn on particular circumstances); Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 509 (2004) (plurality opinion) (requiring that the propriety of
Hamdi’s capture be decided by a “neutral decisionmaker” rather than his captors); id. at 553
(Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that due process required
at least as much procedural protection for Hamdi as the plurality had outlined); Wong Yang
Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40-41 (1950) (explaining that a fundamental purpose of the
APA was “to curtail and change the practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties
of prosecutor and judge”); Humphries v. County of Los Angeles, 554 F.3d 1170, 1197 (9th
Cir. 2009) (“[A] single person, charged with investigating serious allegations of child abuse,
may not adjudicate those allegations for placement on the CACI and serve as appellate
commissioner in review of his own decision. The risk of perpetuating any original error is too
great.”); White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 767 (7th Cir. 2001) (noting that due process
would block an officer who investigated a charge of prison misconduct from sitting on a
prison disciplinary board charged with determining whether to reduce the prisoner’s “goodtime” credits).
211
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1, 8-9 (2016).
212
349 U.S. 133, 139 (1955) (holding that it violates due process for judge acting as oneperson “grand jury” also to have the power to try witness for contempt for committing perjury
during hearing).
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can be a judge in his own case”213 the Court found the risk of bias unacceptably
high. “Having been a part of [the accusatory] process a judge cannot be, in the
very nature of things, wholly disinterested in the conviction or acquittal of those
accused.”214 Generalized, that same concern is present when the head(s) of an
agency are involved in initiating or authorizing an investigation and then making
a final determination as to whether there has been a violation. And potentially
the same concerns could be present, though more attenuated, when different
individuals all employed by the same agency undertake those tasks.
Likewise, there are serious questions about possible bias in agency
adjudication. For decades, observers have seen a risk that if a prosecutor or
investigator then becomes the adjudicator she may rely on extra-record evidence
or have developed a distorting will to win.215 At the agency-head level, as Philip
Elman famously contended a generation ago,216 prejudgment and the reality or
appearance of bias and unfairness are very real concerns (even if these concerns
have proven difficult to confirm).217
And it is easy to imagine inappropriate activity connected to commingling—
handpicking ALJs for particular cases, for example218—that would violate due
process. But that prospect stops well short of saying that ALJs must be presumed
to be unconstitutionally biased. Congress and individual agencies have engaged
in serious efforts to protect against unfairness arising from the combination of
functions. The APA’s separation of functions provisions,219 guarantees of

213

Williams, 579 U.S. at 8-9 (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136).
Id. at 9 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 137).
215
See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, supra note 58, at 56.
216
Philip Elman, Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission, 59 GEO. L.J.
777, 810-12 (1971); Philip Elman, A Note on Administrative Adjudication, 74 YALE L.J. 652,
653-54 (1965); Dean Foods Co., 70 F.T.C. 1146, 1311 (1966) (Elman, Comm’r, dissenting)
(noting that “counsel for the Commission . . . were insensitive or indifferent to these
considerations [concerning impartiality] in presenting the Commission’s position before the
Court of Appeals”). For a more recent echo of Elman’s campaign, see generally Andrew N.
Vollmer, Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings, 52 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 103 (2018).
217
See Special Comm., Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law
Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J.
43, 119-24 (1989) (concluding after study and debate that unity of functions in the FTC should
be maintained); Richard A. Posner, The Behavior of Administrative Agencies, 1 J. LEGAL
STUD. 305, 343 (1972) (concluding that the combination of functions did not skew the FTC
toward pursuing complaints that would or should otherwise have been dismissed).
218
See, e.g., Resource Agency Hearings and Alternatives Development Procedures in
Hydropower Licenses, 81 Fed. Reg. 84389, 84392 (Nov. 23, 2016) (to be codified at 7 C.F.R.
pt. 1; 43 C.F.R. pt. 45; 50 C.F.R. pt. 221) (final rule) (rejecting factual premise of
commenter’s assertion that Department of Interior ALJs lack neutrality in part because
individual judges are handpicked for particular cases).
219
5 U.S.C. § 554(d). For an overview see A GUIDE TO FEDERAL AGENCY ADJUDICATION
148-59 (Jeffrey B. Litwak ed., 2d ed. 2012).
214
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independence for ALJs,220 and the application of the Model Code of Judicial
Conduct to ALJs and other administrative judges,221 to name a few, all matter.
In sum, the received wisdom is correct: structural protections are important;
the combination of functions poses due process risks; it may be unacceptable in
some cases; but it is not per se a violation of due process. Due process will not
deliver the across-the-board facial invalidation sought by those relying on the
anti-accumulation principle. But, in cases where the risks of bias go beyond
broad presumptions, due process provides a remedy.222
IV. CHECKING THE EXECUTIVE WITHOUT SEPARATION OF POWERS
The rise of the executive branch has prompted another group of scholars and
commentators to turn to separation of powers as a framework for motivating,
grounding, and conceptualizing the executive branch and reforms. What they
share with proponents of the anti-accumulation principle is the idea that general
separation-of-powers principles speak to the internal structure of the executive
branch. They differ in that they view separation of powers in broadly
functionalist or perhaps even metaphorical terms. While these reformers are
asking the right set of questions—what are the critical checks on executive
power?—like proponents of the anti-accumulation principle, their separation-ofpowers vocabulary is more limiting than illuminating. Separation of powers
pertains to their analyses in only the most abstract way as a shorthand for
institutional designs that constrain power. But use of that constitutional
shorthand has its own risks and limitations.

220

5 U.S.C. §§ 1305, 3105. ALJs are also exempt from performance ratings, evaluation,
and bonuses. Id. § 4301(2)(D); 5 C.F.R. § 930.206 (2021). The Office of Personnel
Management, not the employing agency, controls an ALJ’s compensation and tenure. 5
U.S.C. § 5372; 5 C.F.R. §§ 930.201-930.211. Almost any disciplinary action against ALJs
may be taken only for good cause established and determined by the Merit Systems Protection
Board on the record after opportunity for a hearing. 5 U.S.C. § 7521.
221
MODEL CODE JUD. CONDUCT, APPLICATION § I(B) (2011) (“A judge, within the meaning
of this Code, is anyone who is authorized to perform judicial functions, including an officer
such as a . . . member of the administrative law judiciary.”).
222
Under the due process approach, a constitutional violation may exist where the
combination of functions is eyebrow-raising but not fatal, yet when combined with other
features becomes unacceptable. For example, Saurabh Vishnubhakat concludes that the Patent
Office’s inter partes review regime is likely unconstitutional. Saurabh Vishnubhakat,
Constitutional Structure in the Patent Office 4 (Sept. 19, 2021) (unpublished manuscript)
(available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=3988952). Combination of functions is part of the
problem—not because of separation-of-powers concerns (appropriately, in our view, that
phrase is not mentioned) but because, given additional details of inter partes review, including
the office’s pecuniary interest in particular outcomes, it creates significant due process
concerns. Id. at 27-29. We are agnostic about Vishnubhakat’s bottom line concerning inter
partes review, but his focus on due process rather than separation of powers strikes us as
exactly right.
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The Puzzling Persistence of Three-Branch Thinking223

Some scholars arguing that separation of powers operates or should operate
within the executive branch are reassured when they are able to identify rivalries
internal to the executive branch that approximate the rivalries the framers
envisioned among the constitutional branches. Jon Michaels is perhaps the
leading example. He articulates an account of checks and balances that focuses
not on Congress, the courts, and the President, but on three “subconstitutional
counterweight[s].”224 The first consists of political appointees.225 This group is
countered by the civil service, the career staff that in any agency hugely
outnumbers the political appointees.226 As others have pointed out,227 the career
staff is in many respects an “institutional rival” to the political leadership.228 The
third check or counterweight is the public at large, civil society.229 Through the
use of Freedom of Information Act, notice-and-comment procedures, and
judicial review, Michaels posits, the public exercises a distinctive set of
constraints on agency policy-making.230
Michaels describes the resulting arrangement of mutual constraint as an
“administrative separation of powers” where political appointees, civil servants,
and civil society have “dispositional characteristics” similar to the three
constitutional branches.231 The political appointees at the top of the agency
organizational chart are the counterpart of the President.232 The civil service—
technocratic, objective, neutral, and there for the long haul—is the counterpart
of the judicial branch.233 And civil society corresponds to the broadly
representative and deliberative legislative branch.234 Michaels argues that the

223
Cf. Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional
Theories, 89 YALE L.J. 1063 (1980).
224
Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
515, 534 (2015) [hereinafter Michaels, Separation of Powers]; see also MICHAELS,
CONSTITUTIONAL COUP, supra note 11, at 59-63 (indicating civil servants’ “conflicting
interests, competing commitments, and different sources of accountability” as compared with
agency leaders).
225
Michaels, Separation of Powers, supra note 224, at 538-40.
226
Id. at 540-47.
227
See, e.g., Jennifer Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance from Below, YALE J. REGUL. (Nov. 16,
2016) [hereinafter Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance], https://www.yalejreg.com/nc
/bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-by-jennifer-nou/
[https://perma.cc/4FY5-7NGU]
(describing various techniques available to career staff to slow or derail initiatives of new
political appointees); see also Katyal, supra note 2, at 2328-35 (endorsing civil service
protections on the model of foreign service officers).
228
Michaels, Separation of Powers, supra note 224, at 541.
229
Id. at 547-51.
230
Id. at 548-50.
231
Id. at 525, 530.
232
Id. at 538-40.
233
See id. at 540-47.
234
Id. at 547-51.
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rivalry, difference of interest, and contestation among these three bodies
replicate those of the three constitutional branches, and serve the same overall
functions.235 “This reproduction” of the constitutional branches, Michaels
writes, “helps mark the administrative state as a constitutionally coextensive,
legitimate, and worthy enterprise, one that redeems, refashions, and arguably
upgrades the framers’ central structure . . . even as State power extends beyond
the boundaries of its 1787 architecture.”236
One might readily agree that these three collections of persons—agency
heads, civil servants, and the interested public—have interests and capacities
that at times diverge and thus can create greater resistance to, or ease the way
for, agency or executive action. The 2020 congressional testimony of members
of the foreign service concerning President Trump’s dealings with the Ukrainian
government illustrate that career staff may use resistance, voice, and exit to
demonstrate their disagreement with, and possibly influence, the course of
presidential or a political appointee’s leadership.237 Moreover, the civil service
can slow policy, show extreme dissatisfaction through departure, and help reveal
misdeeds.238 So too, interest groups and industry can have a dramatic effect on
administrative action through direct and indirect lobbying as well as litigation.239
But Michaels is taking things a step further. He argues that “there is something
special about these three administrative players in particular. Individually and
collectively, they channel the dispositional characteristics and institutional
obligations of the three great constitutional branches.”240
One objection to his account would be that these three players only very
loosely “channel the dispositional characteristics and institutional
obligations”241 of the President, courts, and Congress. The fit is far from perfect,
as Michaels acknowledges.242 A second objection would be that if one is looking
for institutions that constrain agencies and channel the dispositional

235

MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP, supra note 11, at 64-66.
Id. at 66.
237
For an overview of various officials’ statements, see House Intel. Comm., President
Trump’s Abuse of Power, U.S. HOUSE OF REPS. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTEL.,
https://intelligence.house.gov/defendourdemocracy/ [https://perma.cc/53U7-Q9RX] (last
visited Feb. 25, 2022).
238
See Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance, supra note 227; see also Jennifer Nou, Civil Servant
Disobedience, 94 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349, 356-61 (2019) (discussing more extreme forms of
noncooperation from civil service).
239
See, e.g., Rachel Augustine Potter, Regulatory Lobbying Has Increased Under the
Trump Administration, but the Groups Doing the Lobbying May Surprise You, BROOKINGS
INST. (July 11, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/regulatory-lobbying-hasincreased-under-the-trump-administration-but-the-groups-doing-the-lobbying-may-surpriseyou/ [https://perma.cc/SH5S-KTDD].
240
MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP, supra note 11, at 16.
241
Id.
242
Id. at 65-66 (analogizing his reconceptualization to West Side Story’s reworking of
Romeo and Juliet).
236
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characteristics of the President, courts, and Congress there are others closer at
hand: namely, the President, courts, and Congress. All three have important and
continuing roles in agency oversight.
But the fundamental objection goes to the determination to replicate the
constitutional tripartite arrangement. Michaels values checks and rivalry of
interest, which is fair enough.243 Indeed, it is a long-standing and mainstream
view that despite the combination of functions, agencies are meaningfully
constrained by numerous checks and balances and that this is a good thing.244
But why should the appropriate—indeed, necessary—checks be three in
243

Id. at 63-75.
Peter Strauss has provided the leading and most sustained account. See Peter L. Strauss,
The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 573, 578 (1984) (conceptualizing separation-of-powers “in terms of
separation of functions and checks and balances”); see also Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory
Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452,
487 (1989) (emphasizing function of judicial review to enforce statutory limits on agencies).
Most obviously, these constraints are found in the carefully designed provisions of the APA:
notice and comment for rulemaking, separation of functions between investigators and
adjudicators, and judicial review. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-596. But they also include oversight
by the White House and Congress, interagency competition, elaboration by all three branches
of the bare-bones notice-and-comment requirements in the APA, the Freedom of Information
Act, and numerous other complex formal and informal structures that create a web of inputs
and constraints for agency actors.
The grandfather of this familiar approach was James Landis, who wrote that “the fact that
there is this fusion of prosecution and adjudication in a single administrative agency does not
imply the absence of all checks. It implies simply the absence of the traditional check.”
LANDIS, supra note 52, at 98. He identified six such checks: agencies operate within a narrow
subject matter; partly as a result, each agency develops a professionalism and set of norms
that constrain it; it must support any order with findings of fact (Landis was focused on the
adjudicating rather than the rulemaking agency, which arose later); individual outcomes will
be limited by the need to further sound policy; many agencies are independent of direct
executive control (it is a little odd to label this feature a “check”); and agency action is subject
to judicial review. See id. at 98-100. Hence, Landis observed: “It is the relationships of the
administrative to the three departments of government that are important.” Id. at 88. Landis’s
list is a combination of what have come to be known as “internal” and “external” checks. See
Metzger, Interdependent, supra note 12, at 439-40 (describing the shared control of courts
and agency personnel over agency actions).
Earlier in The Administrative Process, Landis states that he was “not too greatly concerned
with the extent to which such [administrative] action does violence to the traditional tripartite
theory of governmental organization.” LANDIS, supra note 52, at 12. Some scholars read that
as a candid, if cavalier, acknowledgement that the New Deal agencies do do violence to that
theory and so are unconstitutional. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Judicial Engagement and Civic
Engagement: Four Case Studies, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV. 887, 896 (2012). As we read Landis,
however, he is firmly in the Strauss camp, acknowledging that agencies are not organized
along the same lines as the overall constitutional structure, but certain that that arrangement
poses no constitutional difficulties. See Charles H. Koch, Jr., James Landis: The
Administrative Process, 48 ADMIN. L. REV. 419, 422 (1996) (“Landis saw the administrative
process as both faithful to the doctrine [of separation of powers] and an instrument for its
modernization.”).
244
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number, much less mirror the three constitutional branches? For formalists, the
answer is straightforward and a necessary consequence of their methodological
commitments.245 Because the current executive branch combines the three
powers that the Constitution requires be separate, the only remedy is to resegregate them in accordance with the anti-accumulation principle. But for a
functionalist like Michaels, liberated to toss aside the particular entities of the
constitutional arrangement, the necessity to identify three and only three
corresponding substitutes is an unexplained and self-imposed restriction.246
Yet Michaels appears to accept the anti-accumulation principle. For him,
consolidating powers in an agency is at least incongruent with, if not violative
of, a constitutional principle of separation of powers.247 That concern sends him
on a search for a solution that will replicate the lost three-part separation, only
within the executive branch.248 Part II argues that there is no anti-accumulation
principle that requires dividing authority in accordance with the lines of the three
branches internal to the executive.249 If that argument is sound, it is unnecessary
to justify internal checks on executive power as replicating the three
constitutional branches. The search for a tripartite response to the growth of
executive power results from the initial diagnosis, namely, that the combination
of functions in the executive violates separation of powers. Once that diagnosis
is abandoned, there is no reason to reimagine a tripartite solution to render
executive power consistent with separation of powers.
245

See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 70, at 492 (“In effect, the new vision rests on a quid pro
quo of constitutional dimensions: we can take away those particular limitations that the
Constitution provides so long as we substitute in alternative protections against the
concentration of power that work as well as the ones they supplant. The weakness of this
argument should, I think, be evident on its face, at least to anyone who does not share the
Progressive vision of good government.”).
246
See MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP, supra note 11, at 64. Even if there is some value
in the numerological approach, it is not clear that three is the right number. For example, one
could argue for four: President, Courts, House, Senate. (If that were the approach, the
difference between political and career staff might better correspond to House and Senate,
respectively, than to President and Courts.) Or five: President, Courts, House, Senate, and the
States. Or maybe it’s only two, since the executive branch is already accounted for by virtue
of the agencies being a part thereof, so one only needs to come up with counterparts for
Congress and the courts.
The strain resulting from the tripartite constraint shows in the way Michaels is forced to
lump together a large number of diverse and distinct entities under the “civil society”
banner—interest groups, industry, the press, the judiciary (via judicial review sought by
members of the public), individual members of the public—in order to hold the total number
of quasi-branches to merely three. See Michaels, Separation of Powers, supra note 224, at
547-51.
247
See MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP, supra note 11, at 57 (“After all, agencies
combined and centralized powers that the framers had separated across three great
branches.”); see also id. at 52 (noting that creation of administrative agencies brought
“heretofore separated powers . . . under one roof”).
248
See id. at 64.
249
See supra Part II.
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Checking and Balancing Internal to the Executive Branch

Some proponents of internal separation of powers are even more thoroughly
functionalist. They worry that the growth of executive power creates the
prospects for abuse, unfairness, concentrated power, mission-creep, and
capture.250 They do not turn to separation of powers to find proxies for the three
branches of government internal to the executive but rather as a vocabulary for
talking about enhanced constraint and checks on executive power.251 They
propose institutional reforms, such as creation of tribunals internal to the
executive branch for evaluating the legality of presidential action, enhanced
tenure protections, overlapping jurisdiction of agencies, and more reporting
requirements to Congress.252 Or they see separation of powers as a unifying
concept to understand the ways in which Congress fragments power within and
among agencies, creates executive branch monitors, requires multiple agencies
to agree, and so on.253
Consider two examples. First, as part of an effort to construct an internal
separation of powers, Katyal proposes establishing an executive branch
adjudicator, protected from removal by a good cause standard, that would take
over the Office of Legal Counsel’s (“OLC”) current role of deciding interagency disputes and leave OLC with the function of advising the President and
other executive branch officials.254 For Katyal, separating the dispute-resolution
role would prevent the client-driven advisory functions from infecting the
independent judgment required for resolving disputes.255
A second example: Sharon Jacobs posits that given the constitutional
importance of separation of powers, “it would be surprising if the idea’s impact
were not felt in subconstitutional domains,”256 including internal to the executive
branch. She argues that a wide variety of institutional arrangements reflect
statutory separation of powers and statutory checks and balances, including:
delegating authority along functional lines (adjudicative, prosecutorial, and

250
See, e.g., Sharon B. Jacobs, The Statutory Separation of Powers, 129 YALE L.J. 378,
389 (2019).
251
See generally id. (discussing separation of powers as structural principle that underlies
congressional delegations to agencies).
252
See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 2, at 2317; ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 143 (proposing
creation of nine-member Supreme Executive Tribunal within executive branch). For a critical
assessment of Ackerman’s The Decline and Fall of the American Republic, see Trevor W.
Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1688, 1742-48 (2011) (book review).
253
Jacobs, supra note 250, at 386-405 (providing example of congressional delegations
which fragment authority and create checks against any one agency exercising authority
without the input or cooperation of others).
254
See Katyal, supra note 2, at 2337. Bruce Ackerman also argues for creating an
executive branch tribunal. See ACKERMAN, supra note 4, at 141-79.
255
Katyal, supra note 2, at 2337.
256
Jacobs, supra note 250, at 386.
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rulemaking);257 delegating authority to multiple agencies,258 including between
independent and executive agencies;259 inter-agency vetoes;260 emergency
overrides;261 and mixing the heads of some agencies among the leadership of
others.262
A place to start in evaluating these kinds of reforms is Peter Strauss’s classic
article on the separation of powers.263 Strauss distinguishes between the
demands of separation of powers applicable to the named constitutional actors—
the President, the Congress, and the Supreme Court—and the organization of
each branch.264 “[F]or any consideration of the structure given lawadministration below the very apex of the governmental structure,” Strauss
writes, “the rigid separation-of-powers compartmentalization of governmental
functions should be abandoned in favor of analysis in terms of separation of
functions and checks and balances.”265 On the one hand, these reformers accept
Strauss’s basic point. They do not aim to replicate the compartmentalization of
government functions internal to the executive branch or to exclude “nonexecutive” functions from it. On the other hand, they still invoke the language
of separation of powers as the fundamental ground for their theories and
proposals. They argue that the statutory reforms and structures they praise not
only lessen the chances of abuse of power or capture, but also implement
something constitutionally inspired, required, or grounded—“internal separation
of powers” or “statutory separation of powers.”266
What does the constitutional vocabulary of separation of powers add to these
proposals and theories? Our answer is: not much. Perhaps Katyal’s reform
proposals are appropriate and viable, perhaps not. But how does this proposal
relate to separation of powers? Virtually every delegation to an agency
designates separate persons to perform separate functions. They separate
adjudicative personnel from prosecutors, designate different persons to perform
watchdog functions from those they monitor, and divide those who propose and
adopt rules.267 And if Congress does not set things up this way, the agency itself

257

Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
259
Id. at 398.
260
Id. at 400.
261
Id. at 402.
262
Id. at 404.
263
See Strauss, supra note 244.
264
Id. at 575-77.
265
Strauss, supra note 244, at 578; see also id. at 577 (noting that agencies exercise all
three powers “in a web of other controls—judicial review and legislative and executive
oversight”—which “are thought to give reasonable assurance against systemic lawlessness”).
266
Jacobs, supra note 250, at 381.
267
See id. at 401 (discussing arrangement in which Congress has authorized the
Department of Energy to propose rules that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is
required to consider on an expedited basis).
258
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does.268 But not every institutional arrangement that divides power or tasks
among separate officials derives from a constitutional mandate of separation of
powers. Katyal’s actual concern seems not to arise from a devotion to a formal
conception of separation of powers but out of a belief that a separate adjudicative
body will be a more effective check on executive power since the “litigant” will
not also be a client.269 While we are agnostic on the merits, that justification is
coherent. But it does not gain any weight by claiming it is required by a principle
of constitutional structure. “Separation of powers” is operating in Katyal’s
proposal merely as a shorthand for the general idea that institutional structures
will divide and constrain power by giving separate roles to separate people.270
So too with Jacobs. Her micro-institutional analysis yields many insights into
which types of institutional arrangements work and for what purposes.271 But
again, these matters of institutional design implicate separation of powers only
in a highly abstract sense. To be sure, Congress has long placed some agencies
closer to the levers of presidential control and some further away.272 And
likewise, Congress has long vested authority in overlapping and fragmented
ways so as to mitigate risks of dominance.273 Congress faces these questions of
institutional design whenever it creates or delegates more authority to an agency.
But what is illuminated by registering these recurrent features of institutional
design in constitutional terms? Here, too, the vocabulary of separation of powers
is merely a stand-in for general ideas about allocating and dividing power.
At most, these theories take inspiration from aspects of constitutional
separation of powers. For instance, they praise structures that create separation
of persons—requiring that some roles be handled by separate people—a
fundamental strategy of separation of powers.274 Likewise, they endorse “veto
points” and requirements for multiple officers or agencies to sign off before the

268

In any agency organization chart, the broad strokes are a function of statute and the
myriad details a function of the agency’s self-organization and sub-delegations. See, e.g.,
Darrel J. Grinstead, Hogan & Hartson LLP, Statutory Framework for the Organization and
Management of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, in HHS IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: CHARTING A NEW COURSE FOR A HEALTHIER AMERICA 209, 210-213 (Leonard D.
Schaeffer, Andrea M. Schultz & Judith A. Salerno eds., 2009); HHS Organizational Chart,
U.S. HHS (July 14, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/about/agencies/orgchart/index.html
[https://perma.cc/NY28-EW2Q].
269
See Katyal, supra note 2, at 2335-42.
270
Id. at 2346.
271
Jacobs, supra note 250, at 386.
272
See DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 60 (2003)
(describing how congressional majorities and unified versus divided government make a
difference to the insulation of agencies from presidential control).
273
See Jacobs, supra note 250, at 389.
274
See VILE, supra note 110, at 36 (discussing how separation of persons became part of
separation of powers); Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, One Person, One Office:
Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1050 (1994)
(extrapolating from the Constitution’s Incompatibility Clause).
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government can take action; those protections do create a “check” and can, in
the right conditions, create a “balance.” At this level of abstraction and dilution,
however, separation of powers is, at best, merely an organizing label for division
of authority, whether within the executive branch, the federal government as a
whole, or a school or corporation.
The point can be summarized by analogy to Arthur Leff’s much-read review
of Richard Posner’s Economic Analysis of Law.275 Leff compares the adventures
of Posner’s hero, Economic Analysis, to those of the heroes of picaresque novels
such as Tom Jones or Huckleberry Finn.276 In these works, “the world presents
itself as a series of problems; to each problem [the particular personal vision of
the hero] acts as a form of solution; and the problem having been dispatched,
our hero passes on to the next adventure.”277 So too Economic Analysis “ride[s]
out into the world of law,” dispatching “one after another almost all of the
ambiguous villains of legal thought.”278 Much the same could be said of these
reformers’ presentation of their hero, Separation O. Powers. Leff suggests that
it is possible that not every legal doctrine is best explained and evaluated in terms
of efficiency.279 Similarly, not every governmental structure necessarily reflects,
or should reflect, the separation of powers.
C.

The Danger of Constitutional Vocabulary

Couching all decisions regarding institutional design within the rubric of
separation of powers is not only unhelpful, it is risky. Like most constitutional
vocabulary, “separation of powers” comes with baggage. First, framing
particular proposals in separation-of-powers terms implicitly claims a
superiority to possible alternatives by virtue of being grounded in constitutional
law. But the sense in which these proposals are thus grounded is so highly
diluted—they are frequently just using “separation of powers” for the broadest
idea of checked and constrained government—that there is no reason to privilege
one set of proposals over another because of their framing or vocabulary.
Second, and more significant, the vocabulary of separation of powers
privileges a limited set of ideas about institutional design. Both the formal and
functional vocabulary of separation of powers focus on separating persons into
functional roles and the existence of multiple veto points. But that is a relatively
confined and abstract vocabulary given the wealth of issues involved in agency
design. For example, a rigid separationist approach would not invite analysis of
the conditions under which having agencies engaging in redundant tasks in a
decentralized manner has advantages over centralization and unification of those
275
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276
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tasks—a central question of the design of national intelligence agencies
examined in the report of the 9/11 Commission.280 To properly analyze that
question, as Anne Joseph O’Connell explains, requires assessing the benefits
and costs of redundancy as opposed to unification. That involves evaluation of
a host of factors, including: the importance of combatting “group think” in a
unified structure; competition among agencies resulting in better information or
approaches balanced against greater coordination costs; increased monitoring
costs; and loss of returns to scale in a larger, unified agency.281 So too, the
separation-of-powers vocabulary forecloses consideration of whether delegation
of authority to individual officials, as opposed to the President, can create
incentives for greater accountability to statutory requirements. When an official
other than the President must sign off on a course of action, that individual faces
the very real prospect of liability ranging from criminal sanctions to disbarment
and public embarrassment.282 These questions of institutional design—and
others like them—call for a more nuanced, context-specific, and empirically
informed analysis than provoked by the vocabulary of separation of powers.283
Third, the vocabulary of separation of powers suggests judicial review as the
central accountability mechanism or at least that priority should be given to
institutional schemes which facilitate judicial review. Judicial review has been
a fundamental feature of separation-of-powers law since the founding of the
republic. While judicial enforcement is an important check on legality, it is also
an incomplete one. Most administrative action is never subject to judicial
review, and when review comes at all it is often many years after the fact.284 But
effective legal constraint requires ex ante controls before the agency makes a
choice.285 Ex ante controls require managerial structures that allow early
280
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intervention and clear internal guidelines. Managerial powers must include not
only the power to nullify a lower-level official’s action but also the capacity to
teach and instill respect for internal norms.286 The separation-of-powers framing
may also unduly prioritize reforms which are judicially enforceable, thus
missing other critical contributors to systemic legality.
CONCLUSION
It is always tempting to look to the Constitution for salvation. And no
structural principle in the Constitution is more celebrated, more familiar, or seen
as more a testament to the genius of the framers than the separation of powers.
The Supreme Court tells us that it is “the central guarantee of a just
government”287 and “essential to the preservation of liberty.”288 It thus seems
almost churlish to argue that it is a mistake to invoke that principle in
constitutionalizing restrictions on the internal structures of the executive branch.
But mistake it is.
Alluring though constitutional principles can be, this Article sounds a
cautionary note about their transposition from their original setting. Separation
of powers may be a splendid or flawed system for allocating authority among
the constitutionally established branches of government. But that the framers
adopted a particular structure for the apex of government—and grounded it in
the idea that the accumulation of different types of power in the same hands is
to be avoided—provides no grounds to suppose that the internal structures of the
component parts must also follow those same lines.
This conclusion has important consequences for current debates. It means that
there is no foundation for the resilient claim, now enjoying support on the
Supreme Court, that an anti-accumulation principle exists and invalidates the
combination of functions within executive branch agencies. That principle
misreads James Madison’s The Federalist No. 47 and lacks any constitutional
foundation. As a result, the anti-accumulation principle provides no basis to call
into question doctrines or institutional arrangements where there is some
arguable combination of functions. Deference doctrines such as Auer and
Chevron may be sound or not, but the fact that they involve interpretation by the
executive branch is not the problem. ALJs may be too beholden to their
employing agency to provide a neutral adjudication, but if so, that is a due
process problem. The executive branch as a whole may have grown too
powerful, but if so, the solution is legislative restructuring and invigorated
congressional action, not judicial intervention on the ground that individuals
within the branch wear too many hats.
It is also a mistake to rely solely on separation-of-powers abstractions to
reform the internal structure of the executive branch. While separation of powers
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provides useful categories, it is hardly a comprehensive vocabulary. Framing
executive branch reform in terms of separation of powers, even in the sense of
broad checks and balances, still shoehorns the conversation into an artificially
limited menu of design choices.

